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Despite the continuing political interest in the usefulness of tax competition and tax 
coordination as well as the wealth of theoretical analyses, it still remains open whether or 
when tax competition is harmful. Moreover, the influence of tax differentials on 
multinationals’ decisions is still insufficiently analyzed. Thus, economists have increasingly 
resorted to empirical analysis in order to gain insights on the elasticity of FDI with respect to 
company taxation. As a result, the empirical literature on taxation and international capital 
flows has grown to a similar abundance during the last 25 years as the respective theoretical 
literature. Its heterogeneity leads to a rising need for concise reviews on the existing empirical 
evidence. In this paper we extend former meta-analyses on FDI and taxation in three ways. 
First, we add the most recent publications unconsidered in meta-analyses up-to-date. Second, 
we apply a different methodology by using a broad set of meta-regression estimators and 
explicitly discuss which one is most suitable for application to our meta-data. Third, we 
address some important issues in research on FDI and taxation to the clarification of which 
meta-analysis can make valuable contributions. These issues are mainly: The influence of 
variables which might moderate effects of tax differentials (e.g. public spending), the 
implications of using aggregate FDI data as opposed to firm-level information on measured 
tax effects, the implications of bilateral effective tax rates, and the possible presence of 
publication bias in primary research. 
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1.  Introduction 
The political interest in tax competition, coordination and harmonization has remained high in 
Europe for more than 45 years (see the Neumark-Report published in 1963).
1 After successful 
coordination and harmonization in indirect taxation, company taxes attract attention in ensu-
ing debates. Most recently, the EU considers a harmonization of corporate taxation in form of 
a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB) combined with formula apportionment 
(Martens-Weiner 2006, Schön, Schreiber and Spengel 2008). Not surprisingly, the scientific 
interest in international tax competition has considerably increased since harmonization ef-
forts in Europe intensified, but also due to rising capital mobility in the last thirty years. Theo-
retical studies in public economics provide the conditions for tax competition being harmful 
and tax coordination being useful. These conditions are however numerous and heterogeneous 
(see the surveys by Wilson 1999, Feld 2000, Wilson and Wildasin 2004, Fuest, Huber and 
Mintz 2005). Without referring to empirical evidence, no unambiguous predictions could be 
obtained. As a result, the empirical literature on tax competition has heavily grown in recent 
years sadly leaving us with a similarly diverse picture as the theoretical analyses (see the sur-
veys by Hines 1997, 1999, Devereux 2006). In contrast to theoretical analyses, economists 
could however adopt meta-analytical methods from the life sciences to gain clearer insights as 
to the effects of international taxation instead of the usual narrative surveys on empirical re-
sults (Jarrell and Stanley 1989, 2005, Stanley 2001). De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 
2006) pioneer this approach in the economics of international taxation.  
As the role of multinational firms and problems of financial arbitrage are increasingly focused 
in the theoretical analyses on the impact of international tax differentials on foreign direct 
investment (FDI) (Fuest, Huber  and Mintz 2005), the multinationals’ options for location 
choice are the starting point for empirical analyses. Dunning (1981) identifies three advan-
tages, called O-L-I, that have to be present for a multinational to invest in foreign host coun-
tries. Besides locational advantages (L) offered by the host country, to which taxation be-
longs, the multinational should be able to realize firm-specific advantages as compared to 
domestic enterprises in order to successfully compete with them despite of costs of setting up 
activities  in  a  foreign  country.  The  ownership  advantages  (O)  must  therefore  be  comple-
mented by an internalization advantage (I) over, e.g., licensing of foreign production.   
                                                 
1.   Debates about the effects of tax competition certainly date back much earlier, at least if the situation within 
countries is additionally considered. Spoerer (2002), e.g., provides historical accounts of tax reform discus-
sions in Zurich in 1883 pointing to the “flights of the capitalists” induced by the enormous tax differential to 
the canton of Basel (see also Georg von Schanz 1890). Another historical study extending the analysis of in-
terjurisdictional competition into pre-modern Germany between 1000 and 1800 stems from Volckart (2002). - 2 - 
 
This broad perspective on FDI allows for a consideration of other factors influencing multina-
tionals’  investment  decisions.  In  particular,  studies  in  international  economics  distinguish 
horizontal expansions from vertical investment decisions and analyze both issues separately. 
Multinationals that engage in horizontal investments want to establish production abroad in 
order to serve local markets. In contrast, vertical investments serve to geographically allocate 
a company’s production chain with the aim of exploiting inter-locational differences in rela-
tive factor endowments. Based on these insights, Horstmann and Markusen (1992) develop an 
instructive theory on horizontal FDI. They show that a multinational will locate production in 
direct proximity to a foreign market if the corresponding reduction of distance-related costs is 
advantageous as compared to the reduced potential of exploiting economies of scale at the 
plant-level. The more important economies of scale are, the less likely local production will 
become (at least in small foreign countries). As to vertical FDI, Helpman (1984, 1985) ex-
plains the splitting of the value chain as being driven by the multinational’s aim to reduce 
total production costs. As long as reductions in production costs, due to lower factor prices 
abroad, exceed corresponding set-up costs, the multinational firm will engage in foreign (un-
skilled-labor intensive) production. Eby-Konan, Markusen, Venables and Zhang (1996) and 
Markusen (1997, 2002) finally present a unified approach. Their so-called knowledge-capital 
model explains both, horizontal and vertical, motivations for foreign investment. This model 
has become the standard theoretical approach in FDI research. 
This theoretical perspective on the multinationals’ investment decisions in a world of interna-
tional tax differences underlines the importance of additional factors influencing FDI and thus 
of the ceteris paribus assumption in tax competition analyses. Some recent empirical studies 
on FDI and taxation pursue the above-mentioned concepts in order to derive a theoretically 
well-founded estimation strategy.
2 However, many studies instead opt for a traditional gravity 
set-up as successfully applied in the empirical trade analyses. The gravity approach explains 
inter-country FDI patterns by a combination of mass variables (e.g. GDP, population) and 
distance variables. This simple set-up is regularly augmented by presumably important policy 
and locational factors. These are – in addition to a measure of taxation – indicators for politi-
cal risk, openness, infrastructure, labor costs, etc. Thus, they often employ sets of explanatory 
variables whose possible importance is also justified by theoretical considerations.  
In addition to the underlying theoretical concepts, empirical studies on FDI and taxation vary 
widely with respect to specification, sample size and so on. One very important aspect in 
                                                 
2.   Early empirical studies implicitly relied on q-style investment models (Hines 1999).  - 3 - 
 
which they differ is the dependent variable. Since FDI in its broad definition does not only 
comprise real investments but also financial flows due to mergers or acquisitions of already 
existing capital, some authors prefer to use a dependent variable which better reflects real 
economic activity. They therefore rely on investments in stocks of property, plant and equip-
ment (PPE) which are undertaken or held by foreign affiliates in a particular host country.  
The central explanatory variable, i.e. the tax variable, also varies on the basis of different al-
ternative concepts. Besides the use of statutory tax rates at the country or regional level, many 
empirical studies rely on average tax rates. In contrast to statutory tax rates, average tax rates 
reflect the tax base to which statutory tax rates apply. They are computed on the basis of pre-
vious microeconomic or macroeconomic data and are therefore also known as backward-
looking tax measures. One special feature of backward-looking tax measures is that they cap-
ture the “true” tax burden on investments or companies. Since they are based on actual tax 
payments they reflect the outcome of tax planning and discretionary tax provisions. However, 
one of their major caveats also lies in this backward-orientation. As Devereux (2006) points 
out, average tax measures might introduce an endogeneity bias into empirical analyses. Since 
they are based on previous data, average tax rates might be influenced by recent investments 
(e.g. through depreciation allowances). The direction of causation between the dependent FDI 
variable and the average tax rate thus might be ambiguous.  
From a theoretical point of view it is preferable to use tax measures which are forward-loo-
king and thus better reflect the situation investors are in when they decide. Forward-looking 
tax measures are differentiated into effective marginal and effective average tax rates. Effec-
tive marginal tax rates measure the tax-induced relative wedge between pre- and post tax re-
turns on marginal investment. They are mainly calculated using neoclassical investment mod-
els developed by King and Fullerton (1984) or Devereux and Griffith (1998, 1999). Devereux 
and Griffith (1999) also calculate effective average tax rates, which measure relative tax-indu-
ced reductions of the net present value of inframarginal, i.e. profitable, investments.
3 These 
measures reflect the major provisions of the considered tax system in a transparent and com-
pact way. They most importantly correspond to the forward-looking nature of investment de-
cisions which are taken on the basis of future taxes triggered by the respective projects. 
The meta-analyses by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006) particularly study to what 
extent the choice of tax rates and the differentiation in the type of investment influence the 
                                                 
3.   Effective average tax rates might also be calculated by means of modeling a representative company’s fi-
nancial development over a certain period of time. See Spengel (1995) or Jacobs and Spengel (1996).  - 4 - 
 
results of empirical studies on tax competition. They put less emphasis on the control vari-
ables which are used in those studies. Most importantly, the impact of public spending on 
multinationals’ investment decisions has received little attention there. Adopting the tradi-
tional Tieboutian (1956) perspective on inter-jurisdictional tax differences, the spending side 
must however not be neglected. This has been recognized by theoretical studies (Keen and 
Marchand 1997, Sinn 2003) and much emphasized by Bénassy-Quéré, Gobalraja and Trannoy 
(2007) in their recent empirical analysis. Similarly, Baldwin and Krugman (2004) show that 
agglomeration effects in geographic centers might allow governments to tax business more 
heavily.  In a  recent unpublished paper,  Brülhart et al. (2007) present evidence  for newly 
founded firms that agglomeration effects actually reduce their sensitivity to tax differentials.  
In this paper, we provide a meta-analysis on the impact of company taxation on FDI by par-
ticularly asking to what extent this impact is moderated by spending policies or agglomeration 
effects. In addition to the use of a broader data set by inclusion of most recent studies, a me-
thodological expansion is made by employing a broad set of meta-regression estimators. We 
explicitly test which estimator is most suitable with respect to the underlying data. Meta-
regression analysis may be based on fixed or mixed effect estimators, again to be distin-
guished into pooled WLS and cluster econometric methods. As shown by Bijmolt and Pieters 
(2001) using random effects cluster estimation techniques which take account of the pre-
sumed dependence problem resulting from multiple sampling in meta-analysis might be ad-
visable. We choose among different methodological options on the basis of appropriate tests. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we provide a qualitative re-
view of the empirical literature followed by a description of the data set derived thereof in 
Section 3 and the descriptive statistics of the studies in Section 4. A classical meta-analysis 
follows in Section 5, while Section 6 contains the meta-regression results. Concluding re-
marks follow in Section 7.  
2.  A Qualitative Review of the Empirical Literature 
Since the early 1980s, a rich empirical literature has evolved disentangling determinants of 
FDI with a special focus on the effects of company taxation. Following Devereux (2006), the 
empirical literature on the effects of taxes on FDI allocation can be classified along three di-
mensions: the type of data used (time series, cross-section, panel data), the level of aggrega-
tion, and the stage of transnational investment decision analyzed in the relevant studies. In a 
strict sense the decision stage dimension only becomes relevant in studies based on micro - 5 - 
 
data; only these are able to separately analyze discrete and continuous investment choices. 
However, in accordance with De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) we use a slightly more general 
classification and distinguish studies which explicitly examine discrete location choices from 
studies using some sort of continuous capital data as dependent variable.
4 Consequently, each 
study can be assigned to one of 18 possible categories (Figure 1). It should, however, be 
noted that not all imaginable combinations of study dimensions have been realized in the past.  


















2.1  Time Series Analysis on Aggregate FDI 
Pioneering studies in FDI research used aggregate time series data (see Table 1). They exam-
ined the correlation of relative after-tax rates of return on U.S. investments and the annual 
volume of inward FDI flows.
5 This early approach by Hartman (1984) has been picked up by 
researchers, which used longer time series and varied the underlying data as well as the speci-
fications (Boskin and Gale 1987, Newlon 1987, Young 1988, Murthy 1989). However, modi-
                                                 
4.   Micro studies using such capital data indeed analyse continuous investment decisions while studies based on 
aggregate capital data generally compound location and continuous investment decisions. 
5.   For surveys that cover this strand of the literature in more detail see Hines (1997, 1999), De Mooij and Ed-
erveen (2003) and Bloningen (2005). 
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fications did not lead to differing results as compared to Hartman (1984). The established 
elasticities with respect to after-tax rates of return did not exceed 0.5 in the case of transfers of 
funds and ranging at around 1.5 for retained earnings. Only when Slemrod (1990) fundamen-
tally reconsidered the research done so far and, inter alia, put forward new controls as well as 
a forward-looking tax measure, doubts were cast on previous results. Retained earnings were 
not affected by taxes while transfers of funds showed significant reactions. In addition, sepa-
rately analyzing bilateral U.S. inward FDI from seven countries that differ in their regimes of 
double taxation relief – as done by Slemrod – did not yield clear-cut insights about the influ-
ence of home country taxation on the tax sensitivity of FDI flows. Following Slemrod’s work, 
Cassou (1997) is the latest paper to perform single time series analysis on bilateral FDI. Based 
on a sample of six investing countries, he also constructed a panel and found a significantly 
negative impact of the corporate tax rate on inward FDI.  
Table 1: Empirical studies using aggregate time series data 
Study  Data  Special Remarks  Tax 
Measure  Method  Main results 
Hartman (1984)  US aggregate FDI 
inflow , 1965-1979 
Annual inward FDI regressed on 
relative after-tax rates of return, 
transfers vs. retained earnings 
BL  OLS  Elasticities with respect to 
after-tax rates of return do 
not exceed 0.5 (transfers) 
and 1.5 (retained earnings). 
Boskin and Gale 
(1987) 
US aggregate FDI 
inflow, 1956 - 1984 
Extending Hartman (1984) with 
alternative data on rate of return 
BL  OLS  Results in accordance with 
Hartman (1984) 
Newlon (1987)  US aggregate FDI 
inflow, 1956-1984 
Criticizing Hartman (1984), coping 
with spurious correlation  
BL  OLS  Results in accordance with 
Hartman (1984) 
Young (1988)  US aggregate FDI 
inflow, 1953  - 1984 
Extending Hartman (1984), with 
lagged investment 
BL  OLS  Results in accordance with 
Hartman (1984) 
Murthy (1989)  US aggregate FDI 
inflow, 1953  - 1984 
Re-estimating Young (1988), with 
adjustment for autocorrelation 
BL  ML Estimator  New funds show elastic 
reactions with absolute 
elasticity greater 1. Re-
tained earnings also are 
more elastic than Young 
suggests. 
Slemrod (1990)  Bilateral US inbound 
FDI from 7 countries, 
1956-1987 
Dummies reflecting time elapsed 
since benchmark year, forward-
looking tax burden measure, con-
trolling for home taxes and home 
country double taxation relief 
BL, FL  OLS  No tax effect for retained 
earnings, while transfers 
showed significant reac-
tions. No clear insights 
about the influence of home 
country taxation. 
Cassou (1997)  Bilateral US inbound 
FDI from 7 countries, 
1970 - 1989 
Time series analysis, then extend-
ing Slemrod (1990) to panel data 
analysis, but no control for double 
taxation relief system 
BL  OLS, home 
country dummies 
(when panel) 
A significantly negative 
impact of the corporate tax 
rate on inward FDI was 
identified. 
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL) 
Source: Own Compilation. 
2.2  Panel Data Analysis on Aggregate FDI 
The idea of using panel data on bilateral FDI flows goes back to Devereux and Freeman 
(1995) (see Table 2). Their sample included 7 OECD countries in the period from 1985 to 
1989. As a further innovation, Devereux and Freeman (1995) introduced bilateral cost of 
capital into their analysis reflecting the country-pair-specific effective marginal tax burden on - 7 - 
 
transnational investments. They found that location choice is indeed affected by taxation. 
Since then, bilateral FDI flows or positions have remained a commonly used basis for subse-
quent research.
6 For a long time, Buettner (2002) is the only one using bilateral cost of capital 
while most of the other studies based on bilateral FDI rely on unilateral tax measures.
7 Draw-
ing on a panel of intra-EU transfers of funds between 1991 and 1998, Buettner also includes 
statutory corporate income tax rates into his regressions thus attempting to catch some effects 
of  infra-marginal,  i.e.  localization-relevant,  considerations.  From  a  (joint)  significance  of 
both, the effective marginal tax burden (EMTR) and the statutory tax rate (STR), he infers an 
impact of the effective average tax rate (EATR) in the determination of FDI. Another note-
worthy result is that explicitly controlling for the supply of public services does not reveal an 
important impact of public expenditures on locational attractiveness.   
Gorter and Parikh (2003) collect OECD panel data of bilateral FDI positions. While they do 
not analyze the joint effect of distinct tax measures, they separately analyze the effects of the 
unilateral host country EMTR and of a backward-looking average tax rate computed on the 
basis of micro data. The tax effects are significantly negative, but provide ambiguous evi-
dence for the home country system of international double taxation relief by means of a re-
stricted SUR model. While restricted regressions that employ the micro average tax rate (Mi-
cro ATR) substantiate zero tax elasticity for credit countries (U.K.), the corresponding EMTR 
regressions  suggest  no  particular  relief  system-specific  impact  on  FDI.  Stöwhase  (2005a) 
draws on bilateral FDI from 8 EU countries to Germany, the Netherlands and the UK between 
1995 and 1999. He shows that only the secondary and tertiary sectors are sensitive to taxation 
while the primary sector is not. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) employ various, i.e. forward-
looking, backward-looking and statutory tax measures without revealing fundamental differ-
ences in the implied tax sensitivity of FDI. The effects they calculate on the basis of their 
panel of intra-OECD bilateral FDI flows between 1984 and 2000 are generally negative and 
significant. Interestingly, by controlling for the amount and the composition of public expen-
ditures, Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) find a positive composition effect, i.e. a higher share of 
investment in public expenditures adds to locational attractiveness and weakens tax effects.  
Bellak et al. (2007) even make an attempt to test Tiebout’s intuition. Based on a panel of bi-
lateral outward FDI flows of seven home countries to eight Central and Eastern European 
Countries (CEEC) for the period from 1995 to 2004, they explicitly control for a possible in-
                                                 
6.   Panel studies using aggregate non-bilateral data are Jun (1994), Swenson (1994), Billington (1999), Broek-
man and van Vliet (2001).  
7.   Devereux and Freeman (1995) provide the bilateral costs of capital employed by Buettner (2002). - 8 - 
 
terrelation between bilateral effective average tax rates (BEATR) and infrastructure as deter-
minants of FDI. Their results provide evidence that infrastructure – especially a good endow-
ment of communication facilities – positively influences FDI; this is directed towards the re-
spective country and may even compensate for higher taxes. Demekas et al. (2007) also in-
clude a proxy for infrastructure into their study. Their panel analysis of aggregate FDI-flows 
between 16 home countries and 24 CEECs during the period 1995 – 2003, which is not meant 
to finance privatization-related projects, employs the statutory corporate income tax rate as a 
measure of company tax burden. Based on this data set, they conclude that infrastructure de-
termines the attractiveness of developing countries, although this is not valid for countries that 
have reached a higher stage of economic development. Moreover, their reported tax effects 
are mainly significant. Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) examine US foreign investment in 18 EU 
countries from 1994 – 2003. They assume a trade-off between public spending and the tax 
rate; public spending as well as a lower tax rate can increase FDI. Their findings confirm their 
assumption. They emphasize that it is not desirable to participate in fierce tax competition 
because of negative spillovers, such as lost funding for public goods. However, they argue 
that tax competition leads to a relocation to more efficient public goods. Wijeweera et al. 
(2007) employ an OECD panel data set of FDI from nine source countries investing in the 
U.S. during the period from 1982 to 2000. They include various controls into their regressions 
which separately resort to forward-looking marginal as well as infra-marginal tax measures as 
well as to the statutory tax rate. The measured tax effects are more robust for the statutory tax 
rates as for the effective tax measures. Controlling for infrastructure yields mainly insignifi-
cant coefficients, which are explained by the generally high level of economic development 
and, thus, infrastructure endowment of all home countries included in the panel.  
Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) concentrate on Central and Eastern Europe as the target for FDI 
flows. They use panel data on bilateral FDI flows from seven home countries to eight CEECs 
for the time span from 1995 to 2003. The authors integrate both, EMTR as well as the EATR, 
into their analysis. Furthermore, like Bellak, Leibrecht and Damijan (2007), they belong to 
the relatively few studies that do not rely on simple unilateral measures which only reflect 
host country specific tax legislation explicitly referring to bilateral measures. Their results 
indicate that FDI-flows to CEECs are primarily determined by bilateral effective tax rates 
(BEATR). Bellak and Leibrecht (2007) argue that this is due to the predominance of new and 
inframarginal investment projects in these transition economies. Hajkova et al. (2006) use 
BEATR in their regressions drawing on a panel of bilateral intra-OECD FDI-stocks over the 
1990s. They apply the transformed least squares approach introduced by Erkel-Rousse and - 9 - 
 
Mirza (2002) which allows to control for unobserved heterogeneity specific for each home 
country, host country and home-host country pair. Generally, they report rather small tax elas-
ticities. The authors explain this result by dint of their very broad set of policy controls. Egger 
et al. (2008) particularly focus on the interrelation of bilateral and unilateral effective tax 
rates. Based on a panel of outbound positions of bilateral intra-OECD FDI between 1991 and 
2002, Egger et al. (2008) show that the estimated impact of the host country unilateral tax rate 
turns positive, when the bilateral tax rate is additionally considered. This reflects the ceteris-
paribus-advantage of multinationals over competing domestic firms in case of rising unilateral 
host country tax rates. The coefficient of the bilateral tax rates, however, is robustly negative 
as it translates the direct negative impact on after-tax returns of transnational investments. 
Table 2: Empirical studies using aggregate panel data 
Study  Data  Special Remarks  Tax 
Measure  Method  Main results 
Jun (1994)   US aggregate in-





system of double 
taxation relief 
BL, FL  Fixed effects : 
OLS, GLS, 
country dummies 
The home country’s statutory tax rate 
has a significant negative effect on 
FDI from countries with residence 
systems, but not on FDI from territo-






1979-1991   
Exploiting US tax 
history of the 
1980s, focusing on 
industry variation  
(18 industries) 
BL, FL  OLS, GLS,  
industry dum-
mies,  time trend 
Foreign investment in the US is tax 
sensitive.  Average tax rates are  more 
precise indicators  for the effects than 
effective tax rate measures. 
Devereux and Free-
man (1995) 




tax burden measure  
FL  Fixed Effects: 
IV, OLS, time 
and country-pair 
dummies or FD 
estimator 
Location choice is affected by taxa-
tion. Granting tax credit for foreign 
shareholders may lead to an increase 
of inbound FDI from exemption 
countries.  
Billington (1999)  Aggregate in-
bound FDI, G7-
countries, 11 UK 
regions, 1986 - 
1983  
  STR  OLS  The statutory corporate tax rate has a 
significantly negative effect on FDI 
inflow. 
Shang-Jin (1997)   Bilateral FDI, 
from 14 source to 
46 host countries, 
1990-1991 
Explicitly control-
ling for corruption  
BL  (Quasi-)Fixed 
Effects: OLS, IV, 
source country 
dummies 
A rise of the tax rate as well as a rise 
in corruption leads to a reduction of 
inward FDI. U.S. investors are not 
significantly more averse to corrup-
tion than are average OECD-
investors. 









There is a significant relation between 
effective tax rates and FDI with a  tax 
elasticity of 0.5. 
Buettner (2002)   Bilateral FDI 
financed by 
transfers, EU 15, 
1991-1998 
Effects of statutory 
and effective mar-
ginal tax burden 
analysed jointly to 
capture average 
effective tax bur-





OLS, IV, home 
and host country 
dummies or FE 




The effective average tax burden 
significantly determines FDI. Public 
services do not seem to have an 
important impact on locational attrac-
tiveness.   








BL, FL  OLS, SUR  Tax effects on FDI are significantly 
negative. Accounting for the home 
country system of international double 
taxation relief provides ambiguous 
evidence.  - 10 - 
 
Table 2 (cont.):      Empirical studies aggregate panel data 
Study  Data  Special Remarks  Tax 
Measure 
Method  Main results 
Bénassy-Quéré et al. 
(2005) 
Bilateral FDI, 11 
OECD countries, 
1984 - 2000 
Various specifica-






OLS, IV, home 
and host country 
dummies 
Tax effects are generally significantly 
negative. A higher share of invest-
ment in public expenditures weakens 
tax effects. 
Razin et al. (2005)  Bilateral FDI, 24 
OECD countries, 





STR  Heckman selec-
tion:  Probit, 
OLS, time and 
country dummies  
Source-country statutory tax rate 
plays an important role in the selec-
tion process, whereas the host country 
tax rate affects the scale of invest-
ment. 
 
Stöwhase  (2005a)  Bilateral FDI, 
from 8 EU coun-




entiated by three 
main economic 
sectors 





Tax sensitivity of FDI varies between 
economic sectors. Only the secondary 
and tertiary sectors are sensitive to 
high tax rates. 
Haijkova et al. (2006)  Bilateral FDI 
stocks, 28 OECD 












Generally rather small tax elasticities 
are reported, presumably due to a very 
broad set of policy controls.  
Bellak and Leibrecht 
(2007) 
Bilateral FDI, 7 
home to 8 CEE  
countries, 1995 - 
2003 
Bilateral forward-
looking tax burden 
measures 
FL  Random Effects, 
time dummies. 
Fixed Effects: FE 
Estimator. 
FDI into CEECs is primarily deter-
mined by the bilateral effective aver-
age tax burden. 
Bellak et al. (2007)  Bilateral FDI, 7 
home to 8 CEE  





looking tax burden 
measures 
FL  Random Effects, 
time dummies 
Infrastructure - especially communi-
cation facilities - positively influences 
FDI and may compensate for higher 
taxes. 




stock in 18 EU 
countries, 1994-
1999 or  2003  
Testing if the 
provision of public 
goods changes the 
tax-sensitivity of 
FDI  
FL, STR  Fixed Effects: 
OLS, country 




The provision of public goods does 
affect location choice. 
The increase of public capital by 
means of higher tax rate though can 
have negative effects on inward FDI-
flows. 




from 9 OECD 
countries, 1982 - 
2000 
Extending Slemrod 
(1990) to panel data 
analysis 
FL, STR  Fixed Effects: 
OLS, GLS, 
country dum-
mies, time trend 
Tax effects are more robust for the 
statutory tax rates as for the effective 
tax measures. Coefficients for infra-
structure are mainly insignificant, 
presumably due to the high level of 
economic development of all coun-
tries considered. 
Demekas et al. (2007)  Aggregate FDI, 
16  home to 24 
CEE countries, 
1995 – 2003   
Threshold effect 
estimation with 
respect to income 
levels, non-
privatization FDI 
STR  Fixed Effects:  
S- GMM, time 
dummies 
Apart from gravity factors, FDI in 
European transition economies is 
influenced by a broad set of host 
country policies.  
Wolff (2007)   Bilateral FDI,  
EU 27 (excl. 
Romania), 1994 - 
2003 
Extending Razin et 
al. (2005), distin-
guishing total FDI, 
equity and debt 
transfers  
STR  Heckman selec-
tion: Probit, 
OLS, time and 
country dummies 
Results are mixed: For total and 
equity FDI no robustly significant tax 
effects are reported. 
Egger et al. (2008)    Bilateral FDI, 22 
source to 26 host 
countries 
(OECD), 1991 - 
2002 
Focus on the inter-
relation of uni- and 
bilateral forward-
looking tax burden 
measures 
FL  Fixed Effects: FE 
estimator, GMM, 
time dummies 
FDI reacts positively to the parent and 
host country tax rate and negatively to 
bilateral effective tax rate. Isolated 
unilateral tax rates can lead to biases 
results. 
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL), Statutory tax rates (STR) 
Source: Own Compilation. - 11 - 
 
As Devereux (2006) points out, FDI-flows (or the resulting positions) rather describe one me-
thod to finance expansion and do not correspond precisely to any specific stage of the overall 
investment decision. However, Razin et al. (2005) apply the idea of two sequential decisions 
– how much to invest conditional on the discrete decision to invest at all – even to bilateral 
macroeconomic FDI data. They analyze bilateral panel data with 24 OECD countries over the 
period 1981 to 1998 and address the underlying sample selection problem by the Heckman 
selection method. Thereby, they do not focus on marginal versus infra-marginal effective tax 
measures, but on home and host country STRs. Their results indicate that the source-country 
statutory tax rate is an important factor in the selection process, whereas the host-country tax 
rate affects the scale of investment. Wolff (2007) closely follows Razin et al. (2005) in his 
empirical approach. He draws on a panel of bilateral FDI flows for the EU 27 countries (ex-
cluding Romania) for the period 1994 – 2003 and runs regressions for total FDI as well as 
equity FDI, inter-company debt transactions and retained earnings. His results are mixed. For 
total and equity FDI no robust significant tax effects are reported.  
2.3  Studies Using Aggregate Data on Affiliates of Multinational Companies  
2.3.1 Location Choice: Count Data Models 
Papke (1991) applies a Poisson count model estimated via maximum likelihood techniques in 
order to analyze the tax sensitivity of location choices (see Table 3). Count data models imply 
the aggregation of the number of considered companies’ affiliates per host country. Papke 
(1991) draws on a panel of plant birth data built from cross-sections of the US Establishment 
and Enterprise Microdata File (USEEM) for the years 1976, 1978, 1980 and 1982. Thereby, 
she is among the first to use a forward-looking tax burden measure. Her results show that 
economic factors such as taxes play a significant role in the determination of manufacturing 
locations, although responsiveness differs considerably across industries. Stöwhase (2005b) 
also relies on count data, but rejects the Poisson model in favor of a negative Binomial model 
due to less restrictive assumptions. His data set is based on data covering the foreign engage-
ments of German multinationals for the period 1991 to 1998. He shows that real activity is 
significantly deterred by rising effective tax burdens, while management and finance as well 
as research and development (R&D) activities only react negatively to statutory tax rates.  
Overesch and Wamser (2008a) examine MiDi-data for the time from 1996 to 2005 and focus 
on German investments in eastern European EU accession countries. The Poisson count mod-
el proves to be applicable for the analysis of location decisions. The negative Binomial model 
is only a viable alternative if country fixed effects are included. Under both models the STR - 12 - 
 
exerts a significant impact on the expected number of German affiliates in a certain host coun-
try. Moreover, the EATR proves to be the more suitable indicator for tax effects in contrast to 
the EMTR. Controlling for infrastructure yields significant coefficients as expected in transi-
tion economies. Overesch and Wamser (2008b) use Midi-data for German outbound invest-
ments in 30 European countries for the period from 1989 to 2005 and study asymmetries with 
respect to tax sensitivities originating from different motivations to internationalize, different 
degrees of internationalization and different business activities of firms. On the basis of a 
negative Binomial count model, they show that vertical FDI in manufacturing is significantly 
more responsive to local taxation than horizontal FDI. Financial service and R&D activities 
are highly tax sensitive as well as affiliates of an only weakly internationalized firm.  
Table 3: Empirical studies using count data 
Study  Data  Special Remarks  Tax 
Measure  Method  Main results 
Papke (1991)  Data on plant births in US 
states, 1976 + 1978 + 
1980 + 1982 
Distinguishing between 
different industries 
FL  ML Estimation 
(Poisson count 
model), state fixed 
effects 
Economic factors, e.g. 
taxes play a significant 
role in manufacturing 
locations, but impact 
differs across industries. 
Stöwhase (2005b)  Microdata on German 
multinationals’ activities 
in 8 EU countries, 1984 - 
1994 
Differentiating between 






Real activities are signifi-
cantly deterred by rising 
average tax burdens, while 
management, finance and 
R&D reacts negatively 
only to statutory tax rates. 
Overesch and Wam-
ser (2008a) 
Microdata on German 
multinationals’ activities 
in EU 8, 1996 – 2005 
(MiDi) 
Inter alia controlling for 
infrastructure 
FL, STR  ML Estimation 




The host statutory tax rate 
exerts a significant impact 
on location choice, but the 
EATR is most suitable to 





Microdata on German 
multinationals’ activities 
in 30 European countries, 
1989 - 2005 (MiDi) 
Focus on tax asymmetries: 
motivation, activity, degree 
of internationalization 




Host-country taxation has 
a higher impact on verti-
cally than on horizontally 
integrated FDI.  
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL), Statutory tax rates (STR) 
Source: Own Compilation. 
2.3.2 Continuous Capital Data: Studies Using Aggregate PPE Stocks 
The early study by Grubert and Mutti (1991) relies on cross-sectional data from the Bureau of 
Economic Activity (BEA), US Department of Commerce (see Table 4). These data are based 
on the level of the capital (PPE) stock of affiliates of US multinational companies in specific 
foreign countries. Grubert and Mutti (1991) report an important effect of taxes as well as tar-
iffs on the international capital allocation. Based on similar data with its focus on tax haven 
countries, Hines and Rice (1994) find a very high negative influence of taxes on PPE posi-
tions which are higher than the estimates by Grubert and Mutti (1991). Devereux and Lock-
wood (2006) draw on the same data source as Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice - 13 - 
 
(1994) using panel data, however. Devereux and Lockwood (2006) develop a two-stage mod-
el, which is estimated in a probabilistic choice framework, in order to be able to better analyze 
the two main elements of the decision-making process even on the basis of aggregate data. 
The results indicate a large and significant impact of EATR, but no impact of EMTR.  
Table 4: Empirical studies using aggregate PPE data on affiliates 
Study  Data  Special Remarks  Tax 
Measure  Method  Main results 
Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) 
PPE stock of  US affili-
ates in 33 foreign coun-
tries, 1982 
Considering host country 
taxes as well as tariffs 
BL  OLS  Taxes and tariffs signifi-
cantly determine interna-
tional capital allocation. 
Hines and Rice 
(1994) 
PPE stock of US affiliates  
in 73 foreign locations, 
1982 
Special focus on tax havens  BL  OLS, IV  A high negative influence 
of taxes on PPE positions 
is reported, exceeding the 
estimates of Grubert and 
Mutti (1991). 
Hines (1996)  US state-specific  PPE 
stock of affiliates from 7 
foreign countries, 1987 
Central Idea: Non-uniform 
distribution of activities 
across states from credit 
countries captures  all non-
tax state-specific factors 
STR  Tobit  There are large negative 
tax effects in the determi-
nation of foreign direct 
investment. 
Grubert and Mutti 
(2000) 
PPE stock of US affiliates  
in 60 foreign locations, 
1992 
  BL  OLS  Significantly negative tax 
elasticities are reported. 
Altshuler et al. 
(2001) 
PPE stock of US affiliates  
in 58 foreign locations, 
1984+1992 
Development of tax sensitiv-
ity from 1980s -1990s 
BL, STR  OLS, IV  Capital has become more 




PPE stock of  US affili-
ates in 19 OECD coun-
tries, 1983 - 1998 
2-stage model integrating 
probabilistic choice frame-
work  
FL, STR  Fixed Effects : 
GMM, time and 
country dummies 
Results indicate a large 
and significant impact of 
the EATR, but no impact 
of the EMTR. 
Bobonis and Shatz 
(2007) 
US state-specific  PPE 
stock of affiliates from 7 
foreign countries, 1977-
1996 
Focus on agglomeration 
effects 
STR  Fixed Effects: 
OLS,  state-home 
dummies, GMM 
The insights as to the 
influence of corporate 
taxes remain only vague. 
In contrast, agglomeration 
effects are confirmed. 
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL), Statutory tax rates (STR) 
Source: Own Compilation. 
Basically, Grubert and Mutti (2000) as well as Altshuler et al. (2001) have access to individ-
ual company tax-returns data. However, they aggregate this information on US outbound ac-
tivities within each host country. Grubert and Mutti (2000) regress the amount of invested real 
capital by the foreign affiliates of US multinationals on ATR in about 60 host countries. They 
report significantly negative tax elasticities. Altshuler et al. (2001) use similar data and find 
out that capital has become more responsive to taxes during the 1980s. Hines (1996) uses 
BEA data as well, but on the US activities of foreign multinationals. He analyzes variations in 
the distribution of PPE between US states and identifies non-tax factors by looking at the dis-
tribution of investments from tax credit countries, restricting their tax sensitivity to zero. For 
exemption countries, Hines (1996) reports large and negative tax effects in the determination 
of FDI. Hines’ approach has been adopted by following authors such as Gorter and Parikh 
(2003). Bobonis and Shatz (2007) use the same BEA data source as Hines (1996) on the US 
state-level foreign-invested capital stock. But similar to Devereux and Lockwood (2006), they - 14 - 
 
rely on a panel covering the years from 1977 to 1996. Bobonis and Shatz (2007) resort to a 
dynamic specification and especially focus on agglomeration effects. The existence of such 
effects on PPE positions is confirmed. However, the insights about tax effects remain vague.  
2.4  Studies Using Individual Company Data 
While economists from the US have access to individual data since several years, comparable 
data for Europe has become available only recently. The improved availability of micro data 
has led to a rising number of studies, which focus on the distinct levels of the overall foreign 
investment decision.  
2.4.1 Location Choice: Discrete Choice Models 
Bartik (1985) was the first to employ the  (nested) conditional  Logit model developed by 
McFadden (1974, 1978) on microeconomic company data (see Table 5). His aim was to dis-
cern the influencing factors of discrete location choices between US states. The information 
on plant locations stems from a data base developed by Schmenner (1982) for the years 1972 
and 1978. He reports a significant negative effect of state taxes on business location patterns. 
Devereux and Griffith (1998) also use a nested conditional Logit model to analyze compa-
nies’ discrete decision where to produce. They find evidence that the EATR – as opposed to 
the EMTR – plays a significant deterring role in the location decision. This result was found 
on the basis of a Compustat panel for the period 1980 to 1994 covering US firms that are lo-
cated in the European market. Swenson (2001) estimates a conditional Logit model as well, 
using panel data on discrete investment choices that were made by multinational companies 
from seven countries in different states of the US between 1984 and 1994. Her data set allows 
for  distinguishing  between  alternative  transaction  types  and  the  source  country  system  of 
double taxation relief. With mergers and acquisitions (M&A) being positively affected by 
rising host country taxes, some of her results, however, turn out to be rather surprising.  
Mutti and Grubert (2004) employ a random effects Probit analysis based on cross-sectional 
individual tax returns of US multinationals investing in 60 foreign locations for the year 1996. 
Controlling for parent characteristics they find that especially labor intensity positively affects 
international mobility. At the policy level taxation is an important factor. However, its ad-
verse effect on location decisions is weakened in high-income host countries, probably due to 
better infrastructure or agglomeration effects there. Buettner and Ruf (2007) opt for a fixed 
effects Logit model, which is based on more realistic assumptions as compared to previous 
studies. For example, it allows parent companies to hold more than one subsidiary abroad. - 15 - 
 
Another virtue of this approach is that (time-invariant) heterogeneity in the firms’ assessment 
of locations and heterogeneity of locations itself can be addressed simultaneously by means of 
fixed firm-specific location effects. They base their data-set on a panel of German multina-
tionals that invest in 18 OECD countries; the panel is provided by the German Bundesbank’s 
MiDi database and covers the time span from 1996 to 2003. Their results confirm the results 
of Devereux and Griffith (1998) regarding the irrelevance of the EMTR in discrete location 
decisions. However, in contrast to Devereux and Griffith, STR shows a stronger adverse ef-
fect on location choice as compared to the EATR, which is only weakly significant. Buettner 
and Ruf (2007) hypothesize that the latter result might reflect measurement problems, i.e. an 
imperfect fit of the employed effective tax rates to individual firms and investments. Buettner 
and Wamser (2008) also examine the discrete location decision by means of a fixed effects 
Logit model drawing on MiDi-data for 22 OECD host countries from 1996 to 2004. They 
report robust negative effects on the parent-specific probability to invest for the statutory cor-
porate tax rate in accordance with Buettner and Ruf (2007). However, Buettner and Wamser 
(2008) consider several non-profit taxes, which mostly do not show significant effects. 
Table 5: Empirical studies applying discrete choice models on micro data 
Study  Data  Notes  Tax  Method  Main results 
Bartik (1985)  Data on plant births in 
US states, 1972 + 
1978  
Numerous controls  STR   Cond. Logit  There is a significant negative effect of 
state taxes on business location. 
Devereux and Grif-
fith (1998) 
Microdata on US 
multinationals’ activi-
ties in F, GER, UK, 
1980 - 1994  
Focus on relevance 
of inframarginal vs. 
marginal effective 
tax burden 
FL, BL  Cond. Logit, 
country and time 
fixed effects 
Results show that the EATR as op-
posed to the EMTR plays a significant 
deterring role in location decisions. 
Swenson (2001)  Microdata on foreign 
multinationals’ activi-
ties in US states, 1984 
-1994 
Different transac-
tion types, credit vs. 
exemption countries 
STR  Cond. Logit, 
state fixed effects 
The tax-sensitivity of FDI differs 
according to transaction type. M&A 
are positively correlated with host 
country taxes. 
Mutti and Grubert 
(2004)   
Microdata on US 
multinationals’ activi-





BL  Random Effects 
Probit 
Industries with above-average export-
orientation are more sensitive to host 
country taxation. 
Buettner and Ruf 
(2007) 
Microdata on German 
multinationals’ activi-
ties in 18 OECD coun-





FL, STR  Fixed Effects 
Logit, fixed firm-
country  and time 
effects 
Results of Devereux and Griffith 
(1998) are generally confirmed. How-
ever, the statutory tax rate shows 
stronger adverse effects as the only 
weakly significant EATR.  
Buettner and Wamser 
(2008) 
Microdata on German 
multinationals’ activi-
ties in 22 OECD coun-
tries, 1996 - 2004 
(MiDi) 
Following Buettner 
and Ruf (2007), 






country  and time 
effects 
There are robust negative effects on the 
parent-specific probability to invest for 
the statutory corporate tax rate. 
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL), Statutory tax rates (STR) 
Source: Own Compilation. 
2.4.2 Continuous Capital Data: Scale of Investment Conditional on Location Choice 
Desai et al. (2004) study the continuous investment decision conditional on locating in a cer-
tain country by means of firm-level data (see Table 6). They do not only consider corporate - 16 - 
 
income taxes but additionally include local indirect taxes into their analysis. Based on BEA 
micro-data on US outbound activities in 1982, 1989 and 1994 they find a tax elasticity of for-
eign affiliate assets of about 7 for both indirect as well as income taxes. Overesch and Wam-
ser (2008a) examine whether tax effects influence the decision on the scale of investment, i.e. 
they do not confine their analysis to discrete location choices as already described above. 
They show that tax effects are robust and highly significant based on their set of firm-level 
data  (MiDi)  that  covers  German  investments  in  Eastern  Europe  and  relies  on  a  dynamic 
framework with differenced GMM estimation. This result holds independent from the use of 
statutory taxes or forward-looking tax measures (EATR and EMTR). Buettner and Wamser 
(2008) analyze the subsequent stages of the transnational investment decision separately. As 
regards the continuous investment decision – based on a dynamic specification – they report 
significant  effects  of  their  forward-looking  tax  burden  measure  which  represents  the  tax 
wedge that was introduced by corporate taxation as part of the user cost of capital. Indirect 
taxes, which are additionally employed as regressors, do not reveal significant effects when 
the study controls for country fixed effects.  
Table 6: Empirical micro data studies analyzing continuous investment decisions 
Study  Data  Notes  Tax  Method  Main results 




Additional focus on 
indirect taxes 
BL  Fixed effects: OLS, 
parent and industry 
fixed effects 
Tax elasticity ranges around 7 
for corporate income as well 
as indirect taxes. 
Overesch and Wam-
ser (2008a) 
Micro-data on German 
multinationals’ activities 
in EU 8, 1996 – 2005 
(MiDi) 
Inter alia controlling 
for infrastructure 
FL, STR  Fixed Effects: 
GMM, time dum-
mies 
Tax effects are robust and 
highly significant. 
Buettner and Wamser 
(2008)  
Micro-data on German 
multinationals’ activities 
in 22 OECD countries, 
1996 – 2004 (MiDi) 
Following Buettner 
and Ruf (2007), focus 
on non-profit taxes 
BL, FL, 
STR 
Fixed Effects: OLS, 
IV, with parent, 





sions are influenced by the tax 
wedge. Indirect taxes do not 
matter as soon as country fixed 
effects are controlled for. 
Tax measures: Backward looking tax measures (BL), Forward looking tax measures (FL), Statutory tax rates (STR) 
Source: Own Compilation. 
3.  The Meta-Dataset  
3.1  Studies Covered 
Our data set results from the combination of the 25 studies that are provided by De Mooij and 
Ederveen (2003) and 21 additional studies.
8 Six of these 21 studies, which are new to our data 
set as compared to De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), have already been included in De Mooij 
and Ederveen (2005, 2006), but we collected the corresponding information ourselves. Since 
we exclude an earlier version of Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) from the old data set taken from 
                                                 
8.   Many thanks again to Ruud de Mooij for providing his data to us. - 17 - 
 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003), we finally obtain a sample of 45 studies of which 15 (33 %) 
have never been meta-analyzed before.
9 Thus, all studies, which appeared in our review of the 
empirical evidence in Section 2, are covered by our data sample. 
3.2  New Variables 
In addition to the inclusion of new studies we added some new study or model characteristics 
to the original data set assembled by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) which have not been 
coded before. In particular, we tried to capture model specifications in more detail. We there-
fore coded two dummies which respectively take a value of one if primary studies controlled 
for country or time fixed effects and zero otherwise. As regards tax measures employed in 
primary work, we now distinguish whether effective average or marginal tax rates reflect only 
host country provisions or also enclose bilateral tax agreements. For the latter case we code 
two new variables named bilateral effective average tax rate (BEATR) and bilateral effective 
marginal tax rate (BEMTR). In addition, we also introduce dummy variables adopting a value 
of one if the primary model controlled for some measure of public spending relevant from an 
investors’ point of view (such as public inputs, public investment, infrastructure or educa-
tion). Likewise, agglomeration effects are captured. Finally, we more closely describe the 
properties of the data by introducing dummies for studies that are based on aggregate data, 
aggregate data on affiliates or firm-level data, respectively. Another modification as compared 
to the old dataset concerns the classification of studies according to the properties of the data. 
We classify each study as either being based on time series, cross-section or panel data and 
consider the question whether discrete location choice has been examined as constituting a 
separate dimension of the literature. In particular this implies a deviation from the methodol-
ogy chosen by De Mooij and Ederveen (2005, 2006) who treat studies that analyze discrete 
location choice as an alternative to time series, cross-section or panel data studies. As a result, 
we are able to precisely capture the different dimension of the primary literature as outlined in 
Section 2 within the scope of our meta-analysis. 
3.3  Meta-Samples 
We employ two different measures of primary effect size estimates. On the one hand, we rely 
on semi-elasticities, which are computed on the basis of the original primary estimates. The 
transformation of original estimates into comparable semi-elasticities (evaluated at the sample 
means) is already done by De Mooij and Ederveen (2003) for the observations included in 
                                                 
9.   The excluded study is Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2001). - 18 - 
 
their meta-study. Whenever necessary, we apply this procedure to those studies which have 
been newly adopted for our meta-analysis.
10 For some studies or models, however, no semi-
elasticities could be calculated. In particular, this holds for Buettner and Ruf (2007) as well as 
some models in Buettner and Wamser (2008). In these cases fixed effects logit estimation is 
applied which does not allow for the computation of the marginal effects needed to derive the 
tax semi-elasticities of foreign investment decisions. In addition to semi-elasticities, we also 
will employ primary t- and z-values as dependent variable in the meta-analysis. As is com-
monly known, t- and z-values result from the scaling of primary coefficients by their respec-
tive standard errors.
11 They thus are by definition standardized and defined on a dimension-
less scale. Consequently, they are comparable across different studies and models. However, 
some primary models include non-linearities with respect to the relationship between FDI and 
taxes. In these cases no exact standard errors of the total marginal effect can be calculated 
without information on the corresponding covariances. Following De Mooij and Ederveen 
(2003) we therefore resort to the assumption of zero covariances.
12 As we also include z-va-
lues obtained from fixed effects Logit estimates in Buettner and Ruf (2007) and Buettner and 
Wamser (2008), the t/z-value meta-sample will include slightly more observations as com-
pared to the sample for the analysis based on semi-elasticities. Furthermore, note that we ex-
clude observations from both samples if the value of the semi-elasticity does not lie within a 
range of twice the standard deviation from the mean semi-elasticity of the study. Also note 
that in analogy to De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006) we premultiply each semi-
elasticity and each t-value by (-1). Thus, the higher one of these effect size measures, the 
higher is the implied adverse tax effect. 
4.  Some Descriptive Statistics 
As Table 7 shows, the meta-dataset contains 730 observations in total. 35.1% of these obser-
vations are obtained from panel analyses on aggregate continuous capital data. Around 24% 
of the observations are taken from micro data studies (study classes 1, 2 and 3). Studies using 
aggregate data on affiliates (incl. count data) make up around 18% of the observations used in 
the meta-analysis. Time series studies mainly published in the 1980s still make up 13% of the 
meta-dataset. The ratio of published work is generally high within the different study catego-
                                                 
10.  Many primary models, i.e. linear models with a log-level specification, directly produce point estimates of 
semi-elasticities. Hence no transformation is necessary. 
11.  For convenience we will only refer to “t-values” instead of “t- and z-values” subsequently.  
12.  An alternative procedure would be to exclude the respective observations from the data sample underlying 
our t- and z-value based analysis. However, this would imply that the analysis based on semi-elasticities and 
the analysis based on the t-and z-values would rely on different data samples. This again would significantly 
reduce their comparability.  - 19 - 
 
ries. However, especially count data models exhibit until today a rather low publication ratio. 
This is explained by the relatively recent accomplishment of some of this research.  
Table 7: Descriptive statistics 
Semi-
elasticities 






mean  sd.  mean  sd. 
Published 
(abs./ %) 
Backward  Forward  Statutory 
1  12  1.6%  0.2  0.8  5.0  3.9  12  100.0%  12  100.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0% 
2  40  5.5%  1.0  0.5  3.7  2.2  31  77.5%  3  7.5%  33  82.5%  4  10.0% 
3  122  16.7%  2.0*  5.0*  1.1  2.1  122  100.0%  2  1.6%  19  15.6%  101  82.8% 
4  73  10.0%  6.0  4.8  2.7  1.0  73  100.0%  39  53.4%  0  0.0%  34  46.6% 
5  12  1.6%  4.2  3.5  1.7  1.4  12  100.0%  1  8.3%  0  0.0%  11  91.7% 
6  21  2.9%  1.2  4.6  0.9  1.4  14  66.7%  0  0.0%  6  28.6%  15  71.4% 
7  95  13.0%  2.2  2.6  1.8  1.4  15  15.8%  11  11.6%  50  52.6%  34  35.8% 
8  95  13.0%  2.5  4.4  1.5  2.2  95  100.0%  48  50.5%  47  49.5%  0  0.0% 
9  4  0.5%  5.7  6.2  1.4  1.5  4  100.0%  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  4  100.0% 
10  256  35.1%  2.9  3.2  3.3  3.9  131  51.2%  54  21.1%  139  54.3%  63  24.6% 
All  730  100.0%  2.8  3.9  2.4  3.0  498  68.2%  170  23.3%  294  40.3%  266  36.4% 
Study  Class:  1  –  cross-section/micro/location  choice;  2  –  panel/micro/cont.  capital;  3  –  panel/micro/location  choice;  4  –  cross-
section/aggregate affiliate/cont. capital; 5 – cross-section/aggregate affiliate/location choice; 6 – panel/aggregate affiliate/cont. capital; 7 -  
panel/aggregate  affiliate/location  choice;  8  –  time  series/aggregate/cont.  capital;  9  –  cross-section/aggregate/cont.  capital;  10  –  pan-
el/aggregate/cont. capital.  
Abbreviations: sd.: Standard deviation. abs. : absolute numbers. Backward: Backward-looking tax rates. Forward: Forward-looking tax rates. 
Statutory: Statutory Tax Rates. 
Strikingly, micro data studies show on average relatively low semi-elasticities while the mean 
t-values are high as compared to studies based on aggregate data. Interestingly, each type of 
tax burden measure – backward-looking, forward-looking or statutory tax rates – is applied in 
nearly all study classes. There are, however, some exceptions. For example, forward-looking 
tax rates are not at all applied in cross-sectional studies based on aggregate data on affiliates 
which are actually dominated by US literature. In return, forward-looking tax rates make up 
the highest share of models in panel studies based on firm-level continuous capital data. 
5.   A Full-Scale Meta-Study  
5.1   The Methodological Framework of Meta-Analytic Estimators 
Sophisticated meta-studies may resort to a broad range of meta-analytical techniques to assess 
heterogeneous empirical evidence on a certain question of interest. These techniques, how-
ever, should not be considered in isolation from each other. Quite the contrary, if thoroughly 
applied  all  meta-analytical  tools  combine  to  form  a  consistent  methodological  framework 
which systematically  exploits the heterogeneity  of primary  evidence. Meta-analytical eco-- 20 - 
 
nomic research explicitly focusing on conceptual issues and therefore choosing a rather tech-
nical approach to the methodology has multiplied during recent years. Instructive examples 
are e.g. Stanley (2005, 2008), Brons, Nijkamp, Pels and Rietveld (2008) and in particular 
Brons (2006) and Bom and Ligthart (2008).
13 We follow these convincing approaches. More-
over, we present the full set of meta-analytical estimators in a formally integrated framework. 
This framework then forms the basis of our meta-analytical estimation strategy.  
5.1.1 Classical Meta-Analysis 
In an initial step, meta-analytical techniques are used to combine single study results to an 
overall estimate which subsequently can be tested for significance. One possible way to di-
rectly uncover the overall statistical significance of the relationship between host country cor-
porate taxation and foreign direct investment would be to perform Fisher’s combined test on 
p-values of the individual estimates. However, this test suffers from several shortcomings. In 
particular it does not indicate the sign of the effect that was tested for significance (Jarrell and 
Stanley 2004). Therefore we concentrate on the computation of pooled effect estimates via the 
use of fixed or random effects meta-analysis.  
Conceptually, both fixed and random effects meta-analysis estimates result from weighted 
least squares (WLS) regression of individual coefficient sizes on an intercept only, where the 
inverse  of  the  effect  size  variance  is  used  as  analytical  weight.
14  The  fixed  effects  meta-
analysis builds on the rather strong assumption that all considered studies generally estimate 
the same true underlying effect. Any deviation of the single effect estimate from this true ef-
fect is thus explained by pure sampling error.  
Let  ˆi γ  be the study-specific estimate of the true effect  i γ  underlying the primary studies 
1,..., = i N . If the true effect is supposed to be the same for all primary studies  1,..., = i N  such 
that  0 i γ γ = , we can write the model underlying FE meta-analysis as 
  0 ˆi i γ γ ε = +   (1) 
i ε  represents the error term satisfying  ( ) ( ) 0 = = i i i E E ε ε γ , and ( ) ( )
2 ˆ = =
i i i i V V ε σ ε γ γ . The 
fixed effects pooled estimator, i.e. the WLS estimator γ  of  0 γ , is given by  
                                                 
13.  The very foundations of meta-analysis, also in a technical sense, have meanwhile been laid by inter alia 
Hedges and Olkin (1985), Hunter and Schmidt (1990), Stanley and Jarrell (1989, 1998), Jarrell and Stanley 
(1990) and Stanley (1998, 2000a, b). 





















  (2) 
As  ˆi γ  is regressed on a constant only, the (efficient) WLS analytic weights are just the recip-
rocal unconditional variances of  ˆi γ . Since  0 i γ γ =  is assumed, the unconditional observation 
variance equals the variance conditional on  i γ , i.e.  ( )
2 ˆ ˆ ( ) = =
i i i i V V ε γ γ γ σ . The WLS analyti-
cal weights thus simplify to 
2 ˆ 1/ ( ) 1 = =
i i i w V ε γ σ . By definition  ( ) ˆi i V γ γ  – or better: its con-
sistent estimate – is generally derived from the estimated variances matrices of the primary 
regressions. Thus, the variance of the idiosyncratic error 
2
i ε σ  is assumed as known.  
In contrast to fixed effects meta-analysis, random effects meta-analysis explicitly allows for a 
distribution of primary effect size estimates beyond pure sampling error, assuming that the 
underlying true effect sizes randomly differ from study to study.  
Let  ˆi γ  again be the estimate of the true effect  i γ  for studies  1,..., = i N  and let  i ε  again be the 
error with the same (conditional) moments as defined above. By assumption,  i γ  is drawn 
from a random distribution such that  0 i i γ γ µ = +  with 
2 (0, ) i iid µ µ σ ￿ . Hence, we can write   
  0 ˆ = + + i i i γ γ µ ε   (3) 
Again  the  pooled  estimator  is  described  by  formula  (2).  However,  the  (efficient)  weights 
ˆ 1/ ( ) = i i w V γ  applied to calculate γ  differ in that they now take account of an additive vari-
ance component 
2
µ σ . While 
2
µ σ  represents the between-study variance, 
2
i ε σ  is consistently 
referred to as the within-variance. The resulting precision weights in the case of random ef-
fects meta-analysis are then given by  ( )
2 2 ˆ 1/ ( ) 1 = = +
i i i w V µ ε γ σ σ . 
2
i ε σ  is again derived from 
the primary estimates. Instead, 
2
µ σ  has to be estimated in a first step.
15  
Since the underlying assumptions of fixed and random effects meta-analysis are mutually 
exclusive, there is a need to test for their respective validity in order to finally choose the ade-
quate estimator for the data at hand. A common test for the null hypothesis of between-study 
                                                 
15.  As regards estimation of 
2
µ σ , Thompson and Sharp (1999) describe various estimators which are applicable. - 22 - 
 
homogeneity, i.e. a between-study variance 
2
µ σ  of zero, is the Q-test. It is based on the 
2 χ -





























γ χ   (4) 
with all variables as defined above and  i w  as the fixed effects weights.  
As soon as the computed Q-statistic forces to reject the null of between-study homogeneity, 
the simple fixed effects meta-analysis is no longer applicable. However, even classical ran-
dom effects meta-analysis remains limited in scope. It in fact takes account of the existing 
heterogeneity beyond sampling error, but it does not attempt to systematically explain this 
excess variability of primary effect size estimates. 
5.1.2 Meta-Regression 
Consequently, most modern meta-studies turn to meta-regression and thus go beyond classi-
cal meta-analysis based on “empty models” by introducing relevant explanatory variables. 
Since these meta-regression models imply a conceptual extension of classical random effects 
meta-analyses, the underlying econometric models remain relatively straightforward. How-
ever, the notation chosen hereafter will take account of the fact that many meta-studies follow 
the suggestions by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) to use the information from all estimated mod-
els in primary studies for meta-regressions (so-called multiple sampling).
16  
Depending on whether all the heterogeneity beyond sampling error can be systematically cap-
tured by the moderator variables, meta-regression analysis can be classified into fixed effects 
versus mixed (also called random) effects meta-regression.  










γ γ i is x β z δ ,
  (5) 
where  ˆis γ  represents the s
th effect size estimate sampled from study i.  0 γ  is the intercept and 
i x  and  is z  are vectors with study-specific and model-specific variables respectively.  is ε  is the 
                                                 
16.  Multiple sampling leads to more powerful tests and more accurate estimates due to the larger underlying 
sample as compared to single estimate sampling. Multiple sampling is applied inter alia in Feld, Baskaran 
and Schnellenbach (2007) or De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006). The question whether single esti-
mate or multiple sampling should be applied, however, is not beyond controversy (see e.g. Stanley 2001). - 23 - 
 
error  term  satisfying  ( ) ( ) 0 = = is is is E E ε ε γ .  We  further  define 
( ) ( )
2 ˆ , = =
is is is is V V ε σ ε γ γ i is x z . 










γ γ µ i is x β z δ
  (6) 
Obviously some systematically unexplained heterogeneity 
2 (0, ) ￿ is iid µ µ σ  remains. All other 
variables are as defined in (5).  
In traditional meta-studies both fixed effects and mixed effects meta-regression models are 
estimated by WLS. Generally, the employed analytical weights  is w  correspond to the recipro-
cal conditional effect size variance implying  ( ) ˆ 1/ , = is is w V γ i is x z . In the case of WLS within 
a  fixed  effects  meta-analytic  framework  it  holds  that  ( ) ( )
2 ˆ ˆ , = =
is is is is V V ε σ γ γ γ i is x z .  Re-
member that we can derive  ( ) ˆis is V γ γ  – or more precisely: the consistent estimate  ( ) ˆ ˆis is V γ γ  
– from the primary models. Furthermore, if WLS is applied to estimate a mixed effects meta-
regression model,  ( ) ˆ , is V γ i is x z  again contains an additive component representing the be-
tween-variance. It holds that  ( )
2 2 ˆ , = +
is is V µ ε γ σ σ i is x z .
17 As in classical random effects meta-
analysis, 
2
µ σ  must again be estimated. Instead, 
2
is ε σ  still is considered as known.  
Particularly for mixed effects meta-regression models, however, estimators other than WLS 
might be considered. Precisely, pooled OLS (POLS) as well as feasible GLS (FGLS) estima-
tion techniques are applicable. While POLS treats each observation equally without applying 
any weighting scheme, FGLS again implies a weighting of observations. However, in contrast 
to the WLS estimation the weighting matrix is not supposed to be (partly) known. It is rather 
fully estimated on the basis of POLS residuals. POLS or FGLS might be favored by meta-
analysts if the unobserved heterogeneity beyond sampling error is perceived as a dominant 
driver of the meta-regression disturbance. The disturbance in this case is simply  = + is is is v µ ε , 
but without explicit decomposition into sampling error  is ε  and heterogeneity beyond sampling 
error  is µ .  is v  must be assumed as iid-distributed with all classical moment conditions for lin-
                                                 
17.  We have  ( ) ( )
2 ˆ , , = +
is is is V V
ε γ µ σ
i is i is x z x z .The between-variance by definition is constant across obser-




i is x z . - 24 - 
 
ear regression models. As regards the fixed effects meta-regression model, it by definition 
should be estimated via WLS since 
2
is ε σ  can be derived from the primary literature, i.e. the 
applicable weights are very reliably known. 
Apparently,  all  the  different  estimators  explained  so  far  basically  differ  in  their  applied 
weighting schemes. The best choice among them should thus primarily be guided by effi-
ciency concerns. None of them, however, explicitly takes account of the cluster-sample char-
acteristics of the meta-dataset and the implied possibility of dependence of observations. Tak-
ing these issues into account, not only efficiency is at stake, but – under certain conditions – 
even consistency. However, if model (6) is transformed such that it shows a nested error 
structure, it can be estimated with cluster-econometric estimation techniques that control for 
the unobserved study-level heterogeneity. The meta-analytical literature in this case often re-
fers to hierarchical or multilevel models. As opposed to the fixed and mixed effects meta-
regressions, these multilevel models account for non-zero off-diagonal elements of the vari-
ance-covariance-matrix, e.g. for within-study correlation resulting from the unobserved study-
specific effects. Basically, these multilevel models correspond to random effects models in 
cluster-econometric terms










γ γ µ i is x β z δ
  (7) 
with 
2 (0, ) ￿ i iid µ µ σ  being the unobserved heterogeneity at the study-level.  
However, random effects models (in cluster-econometric terms) should be considered with 
caution. Not only should one test for the mere existence of an unobserved study-level effect, 
but equally important is a test whether the nested error and the meta-regressors are uncorre-
lated. Surprisingly, neither test is routinely performed in multilevel meta-analyses. Instead, 
the absence of an endogeneity problem is simply imposed by assumption. If, however, unob-
served study-level heterogeneity exists and it is correlated with the meta-regressors, multi-
level meta-analysis (as well as pooled estimators) will not be consistent. In this case only a 
fixed effects cluster-econometric approach is viable.  
                                                 
18.  Rather basic multilevel models are also referred to as random intercept models. In principle, they might be 
extended to more complex forms known as random coefficient models (see e.g. Goldstein 1995). Also more 
than two levels might be considered. Econometrically this affects the definition of the nested error terms.  - 25 - 
 
5.2  Publication Bias  
So far we focused on the methodological framework integrating all meta-analytical estima-
tors. However, another important issue in the meta-analytical literature is the identification 
and remedy of publication bias.
19 It is presumed that authors or referees of primary literature 
might – even unconsciously – prefer statistically significant results over the reporting of in-
significant effects in published work. Authors might adjust their model specifications, em-
ployed estimators or data samples until significance is eventually found. If this were indeed 
the case, particularly authors working on small-sample studies and therefore struggling with 
imprecise estimates would have to seek to produce large effect size estimates. In this line of 
reasoning, nearly all meta-analytical techniques designed to identify publication bias draw on 
the correlation of primary effect size estimates and their respective standard errors.   
Consequently, most statistical instruments for the detection of publication bias imply the in-
troduction of the primary effect measures’ standard error as a moderator variable into the me-
ta-analytical regression equations. A significant partial effect of the primary standard error on 
effect size then provides evidence for the existence of publication bias. From a methodologi-
cal perspective, these tests for publication bias can extend classical meta-analysis as well as 
sophisticated meta-regressions which already control for the influence of other relevant study 
and model characteristics. Many of the statistical models coping with publication bias as e.g. 
presented in Stanley (2005) are, however, somewhat restricted. Precisely, they assume that the 
potential publication bias is only one-directional. Primary work then would not just seek sig-
nificance, but the effect searched for is additionally supposed to exhibit a predetermined sign. 
More general models which instead allow for bi-directionality of publication bias mainly rely 
on the absolute primary effect size estimates as dependent variable. They therefore might in-
deed verify the significance of even bi-directional publication bias. They are, however, not 
able to simultaneously compute meaningful partial effects of model and study characteristics 
on the primary effect size estimates or – with respect to classical meta-analysis – a meaning-
ful pooled effect size measure.  
Only recently, Bom and Ligthart (2008) have developed a framework allowing for direction-
ally unrestricted publication bias which does not rely on the absolute effect size estimates as 
dependent variable. Their suggested econometric solution works in a random as well as in a 
                                                 
19.  For a concise methodological survey see Stanley (2005). Stanley has been pioneering meta-analysis in eco-
nomics with a focus on publication bias (see also e.g. Stanley 2001, 2008).  
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fixed effects meta-analytical context. It can by construction be applied to both classical meta-
analysis as well as meta-regressions. We will, however, only focus on the meta-regression 
application of the procedure developed by Bom and Ligthart.
20 This yields the following gen-
eral meta-regression formula:  
( ) ( ) 0 1 2 ˆ ˆ ˆ = + + + + + is is is pis is is nis is se D se D v γ γ ϕ γ γ ϕ γ γ i is x β z δ  
All parameters and variables are defined as above. The scalars  1 ϕ  and  2 ϕ  measure the (possi-
bly asymmetric) effect on  ˆis γ  exerted by primary model precision as measured by the primary 
estimate’s  standard  error  ( ) ˆis is se γ γ .  pis D   ( ) nis D   are  dummies  equaling  one  if  ˆ 0 > is γ  
( ) ˆ 0 < is γ . These dummies actually allow for the bi-directionality of the bias. The disturbance 
term  is v  contains the error components and thus differs according to whether meta-regression 
model (5), (6) or (7) is assumed. 
Following the idea of publication bias, meta-regression models using primary t-values as de-
pendent variable should not include primary standard errors as a regressor. In the logic of 
publication bias there is correlation between estimated effect size magnitude and precision 
because authors with the aim to publish are persistently seeking high t-values. Consequently, 
there should be no correlation between these t-values and the standard errors if publication 
bias was present. What is more, such a specification would imply a severe simultaneity prob-
lem. We will, however, control for the existence of publication bias via the inclusion of a 
dummy variable reflecting the publication status of primary work.  
 
6.   Estimation Strategy 
6.1   Classical Meta-Analysis and First-Stage Meta-Regressions 
Our estimation strategy will be based on a step-by-step procedure. First, a classical meta-
analysis will be performed. It will produce information about the presumed existence of some 
heterogeneity beyond sampling error and the adequate pooled effect estimate. Subsequently, 
the focus will be on the full set of meta-regression estimators outlined above. These first-
stage meta-regressions will thereby include a very basic set of meta-regressors which accord-
                                                 
20.  Extending classical meta-analysis with respect to publication bias actually boils down to a regression on one 
moderator variable. The results of simple linear bivariate regressions, however, might be somewhat mislead-
ing as they do not necessarily correspond to multiple regressions on the full set of relevant variables.  
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ing to the literature review in Section 2 are assumed to be most fundamental. Eventually, after 
identifying the underlying data characteristics by means of suitable tests we will be able to 
choose our preferred model. On the basis of this model which best fits the meta-data at hand 
we will estimate several extensions of the basic model focusing on different research ques-
tions. Subsequently, some further robustness checks will be performed. 
As to the sequence of meta-regression estimators, the simplest but most fundamental first-
stage meta-regression will be the POLS estimate of model (6). Following Wooldridge (2002, 
2003), standard errors robust to arbitrary heteroscedasticity and correlation within clusters 
will be calculated. The latter seems highly advisable in the case of POLS since it neglects the 
possible existence of study-specific unobserved effects as well as possible correlation in the 
idiosyncratic errors. In other words, we have to make POLS standard errors immune to the 
possibility that model (7) rather than (6) is the true model. Leaving existing unobserved ef-
fects not modeled would produce intra-cluster correlation and imply underestimated standard 
errors, thus leading to incorrect, i.e. anti-conservative, inference. Second, as regards correla-
tion in the idiosyncratic errors, Wooldridge (2003) hints at possible intra-cluster correlation if 
common slopes across clusters (here: studies) are assumed. 
According to the methodological system of meta-analytical estimators outlined above we will 
estimate model (5) with “traditional” WLS. Besides simple POLS, model (6) will also be es-
timated by WLS as it is regularly done in traditional meta-analysis. Moreover, model (6) will 
be estimated by FGLS, as well. By weighting with the inverse of the conditional variance ma-
trix - either estimated from POLS residuals (FGLS) or taken from the primary studies (WLS) 
- these estimators are able to explicitly correct for the supposedly high degree of heterosce-
dasticity in the meta-regression disturbances. However, for the same reasons as in the case of 
POLS we will again compute standard errors clustered at the study-level for all estimators. 
Finally, the full set of meta-regression estimators will be completed with model (7) being es-
timated by random effects and the more robust fixed effects cluster-econometric techniques in 
order to take account of possible study-specific unobserved heterogeneity and the implied 
potential  dependence  problem.  As  regards  random  effects  cluster-econometrics,  the  most 
popular estimator in the meta-analytical context is the restricted maximum likelihood estima-
tor (REML). Besides REML we will also employ the standard GLS random effects estima-
tor.
21  
                                                 
21.  Both estimators are closely related as random GLS estimates can be obtained from ML estimation by re-
stricting the number of iterations to one (Hox 2002).  - 28 - 
 
With respect to the fixed effects cluster-econometric techniques, we will employ the standard 
within-estimator. However, another interesting estimator for fixed effects analysis has been 
proposed by Pluemper and Troeger (2007). Their fixed effects vector decomposition estimator 
(FEVD) is able to cope with endogeneity problems and neither has to eliminate all variables 
which are invariant within clusters nor relies on instrumental variables as in the case of the 
more established Hausman-Taylor approach. As study-level variables are by definition con-
stant within studies and instruments will hardly be available in the meta-analytical context, 
FEVD here might be an appealing alternative to the standard within-estimator. FEVD estima-
tion is based on a three-step algorithm. In a first step, standard fixed effects estimates are 
computed. Estimated cluster-specific effects then are regressed on within-invariant cluster-
level variables. The previously generated cluster-specific effects are thus decomposed into an 
explained part – explained by the observed cluster-specific variables – and an unexplained 
part. Subsequently, only the unexplained part, i.e. the step 2 residuals, is again included into 
the original estimation  equation. This equation, containing within-invariant, within-variant 
variables and the unexplained part of the cluster-specific effect, now can be estimated by 
POLS because the endogeneity problem has been resolved.
22 However, as by construction the 
FEVD  estimator  yields  the  same  coefficient  as  standard  within-estimation  for  all  within-
variant model characteristics we only regard it as an option for the second stage regressions.  
Notably, these first-stage regressions will be run twice. In a first step the semi-elasticities will 
serve as the dependent variable and in a second step the t-values taken from the primary re-
gressions will be used as the dependent variable.
23 This is in line with our major aim to fully 
and transparently exploit all the information available from primary studies. The division by 
standard errors guarantees that t-values are defined on a common dimensionless scale that is 
independent of the original metric. Consequently, they are a valid methodological alternative 
to the use of semi-elasticities. Using t-values as effect-size index is also advocated by Jarrell 
and Stanley (1989, 2005). However, as has been underscored by Becker and Wu (2007), t-
values do not correspond to pure estimators of effect magnitude. In addition to effect magni-
tude, t-values are influenced by the precision of the estimate. They are thus estimators of ef-
fect significance rather than mere effect magnitude. Correspondingly, a positive partial corre-
                                                 
22.  The FEVD estimator has been applied in recent studies e.g. by Beckmann (2007) and Gatti (2008). 
23.  We will, however, not run WLS meta-regressions with t-values as the dependent variable. The use of t-
values as dependent variable can be interpreted as restricting the precision-weighting implied by WLS meta-
regression to only the left-hand side of model (5). There should thus be no difference between estimation of 
model (5) with POLS or WLS when t-values are used as dependent variable since the WLS analytical 
weights by definition are equal to one. Heteroscedasticity now might, however, result from additional error 
components, i.e. unexplained heterogeneity as in model (6). We will therefore also employ the most flexible 
pooled estimator applying a weighting scheme: FGLS. - 29 - 
 
lation between t-values and a certain regressor would reveal that the respective study or model 
characteristic on average fosters the identification of significant adverse tax effects on FDI. 
6.2   Choosing the Preferred Meta-Regression Estimator  
From the first-stage meta-regressions for both dependent variables only the preferred estima-
tors will form the basis for the subsequent general-to-specific analyses. Therefore we will – 
after running a standard RESET test for misspecification – employ a set of suitable statistical 
tests to systematically guide this choice.  
In meta-analyses the conditional variance of the idiosyncratic error  ( ) , is V ε i is x z  is directly 
derived from the estimated variance matrix of the corresponding primary models. It is specific 
to each model and depends mainly on factors such as sample size and estimation method. Ap-
parently, meta-analyses by construction have a problem with heteroscedasticity. The natural 
starting point of our sequence of statistical tests is thus a standard test for heteroscedasticity 
such as the White-test or the Breusch-Pagan test.  
If the null of homoscedasticity is indeed rejected, this will in general favor estimation tech-
niques such as WLS estimates of models (5) and (6) or FGLS due to their explicit treatment 
of the heteroscedasticity in the disturbances.
24 Estimates of model (6) should be preferred 
over those of model (5) if the Q-test for heterogeneity still rejects its null even after introduc-
tion of the moderator variables. However, none of these pooled estimators would be efficient 
– and under certain conditions not even be consistent - in the case of observation dependence 
due to unobserved study-level heterogeneity.  
We therefore explicitly test for presence of unobserved cluster effects. However, we do not 
solely argue based on the results of a standard Breusch-Pagan LM test. Instead, we in addition 
adapt a similar test proposed by Wooldridge (2002) to the meta-analytic unbalanced cluster-
sample context. The test is robust to a non-normal distribution and – in particular – heterosce-
dasticity of the regression error terms. The test has power both against a random effects speci-
fication as well as against any kind of serial correlation in the errors. Offering these appealing 
features the test seems predestined for application in the meta-analytical context. 
Since under the null of no within-cluster correlation the variance matrix of the disturbances 
for each study is diagonal, the Wooldridge-type test verifies if the average sum of the esti-
                                                 
24.  In order to estimate the weighting matrix supposed as unknown in FGLS we regress the squared POLS re-
siduals (in logs) on the full set of meta-regressors and then exponentiate the fitted values. This fairly flexible 
procedure has already been proposed by Harvey (1976). For details see Greene (2003). - 30 - 
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The subscript  1,..., = i N  denotes the studies included in the analysis, while  1,..., = i s S  in-
dexes the observed estimates per study.  ˆis v  represents the pooled OLS residuals used as esti-
mators for the pooled regression error  is v . Under the null hypothesis this statistic is distrib-
uted asymptotically as standard normal. Not rejecting the null clearly advocates the use of 
pooled estimators. The test statistic’s null distribution, however, is only asymptotically valid. 
With  44 = N  (semi-elasticities) or  45 = N  (t-values) respectively we are clearly at the lower 
bound of the sample size needed for reliable asymptotic inference. We are, however, con-
vinced that the test might give us additional interesting insights. 
In a further step, we check whether there is an endogeneity problem linked to the unobserved 
heterogeneity. If this is indeed the case, standard pooled or multilevel techniques will not 
yield consistent estimates. Instead, fixed effects cluster-econometric approaches must be em-
ployed. However, the Hausman test as a standard tool for endogeneity checks should not be 
applied  in  the  meta-analytical  context  due  to  heteroscedasticity  in  the  disturbances.                                                                                                                                                               
Instead,  we  use  the  robust  artificial  regression  approach  proposed  in  Wooldridge  (2002) 
which is equivalent to the Hausman test. The test is obtained by estimating an artificial re-
gression of the following form 
  = + + ) ) && is is γ υ is is w α z ς
 
where  )
is γ  is the quasi-demeaned version of  is γ .  ( ) = ) ) )
is i is w x ,z  represents a vector containing 
the quasi-demeaned study-level and model-level variables in  i x  and  is z  respectively.  &&is z  is 
the fully demeaned version of all elements of  is z which vary within studies.
25  is υ  is a homo-
scedastic and independent error term. The test rejects the null of no correlation between indi-
                                                 
25.  By definition all study-level variables in  i x  cannot vary within studies.  - 31 - 
 
vidual error component and independent variables if the set of coefficients in vector ς  is sta-
tistically significant.  
 
































Figure 2 illustrates the meta-analytical set of estimators and their conceptual relationships. Also 
the tests applied to chose the most suitable among these estimators according to the meta-data at 
hand is reflected in Figure 2. It thus draws on the explanations given in Section 5.1 and Section 
6.2. 
6.3   Expected Results 
The insights sought for in this meta-study on the effect of taxation on FDI are twofold. With 
the number of observations almost doubled it will be interesting to see whether the implica-
tions derived from primary empirical research today are the same as in the past. Due to the 
sophisticated estimation strategy the meta-results will be of outstanding precision. On the oth-
er hand, we will employ the meta-analysis to learn about the influence of the newly included 
meta-variables on the effect size estimates. With respect to the publication bias control we 
might expect this phenomenon to be present. Publication bias has been detected in almost all 
fields of empirical sciences and we do not expect FDI research to be an exemption.  
As regards the more detailed differentiation of tax burden measures used in primary studies 
we follow the reasoning put forward by Egger et al. (2008) and suggest that bilateral forward-- 32 - 
 
looking tax rates best capture the tax effect on transnational investments. Thus, we expect 
studies relying on these bilateral measures to yield the highest effect size estimates, resulting 
in a positive coefficient for the respective meta-regression dummy. As for the difference in 
tax  effect  size  estimates  between  aggregate  and  micro  data  studies  we follow  the  line  of 
thought outlined in Becker et al. (2006) who argue that studies relying on aggregate FDI data 
might suffer from simultaneity and endogeneity problems. If large unobservable parts of the 
aggregate location conditions are not controlled for but put into the primary regression error, 
this might bias measured tax effects. We are, however, not exactly sure about the sign of this 
bias. In the same line of reasoning, controlling for country fixed effects in primary regression 
models might indeed alter the estimated tax effects. As they should correct for possible biases 
due to unobserved country effects, we expect the opposite sign as compared to the one found 
for the “aggregate”-dummies. However, taxes are part of a country’s aggregate location char-
acteristics and only limitedly time-variant. Consequently, their influence might be captured to 
a large extent by the country-specific effects. Controlling for the latter might thus reduce the 
significances of measured tax effects.  
As to the inclusion of time dummies into primary regressions, its effects are more difficult to 
anticipate. Time fixed effects generally absorb the influence that temporary (unobserved) ma-
croeconomic conditions exert on the considered dependent variable. However, if taxes do not 
sufficiently vary across cross-section units (firms within countries or countries within consid-
ered regions) within the different time periods, then time fixed effects might mitigate identi-
fied tax effects or – precisely – their significance. 
As to the inclusion of expenditure side variables into primary models, we derive our expecta-
tions about their effect on estimated tax impacts on FDI from some relatively straightforward 
theoretical  considerations. These argue within the scope of the  Zodrow and Mieszkowski 
(1986) framework and recent considerations by Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) extending this 
model.
26 Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) rely on two partial effects to compute the overall effect 
of taxation on FDI. These partial effects measure the ceteris-paribus impacts of respectively 
the company tax burden and public spending on FDI. Theoretically, they follow from the in-
ternational arbitrage equilibrium condition which requires equality of marginal after-tax re-
                                                 
26.  The framework builds on governments which maximize a representative agent’s utility U(x,G) with x denot-
ing the consumption of a (single) private good and G as public input used by both households and firms. G 
is financed by capital taxes and subject to the budget constraint. Production depends on capital, labor and 
public inputs. Marginal productivity is decreasing in all input factors. Inputs are complementary, but com-
plementarity is decreasing with increasing inputs. For a comprehensive outline of the model see Benassy-
Quéré et al. (2007) and for more fundamental version see also Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). - 33 - 
 
turn and real world market interest rate. Their estimated values are obtained from empirical 
regressions including both the tax burden as well as expenditure side variables as regressors. 
The overall effect of tax on FDI, however, according to the Zodrow and Mieszkowski frame-
work takes into account that tax and public expenditure variables are linked via the public 
budget constraint. It therefore integrates the direct tax effect on FDI and the impact of increas-
ing public inputs financed by the tax receipts. Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) show that the ce-
teris-paribus effects of taxes and of public spending still might combine to an overall effect if 
the budget constraint is imposed ex post. And they indeed find that the computed overall ef-
fect of taxation on FDI is moderated by public spending, i.e. the direct adverse tax effect is 
partially compensated for if tax receipts – at least partially – finance better public inputs. Sim-
ilar moderating effects can be expected for the inclusion of agglomeration variables. 
Meta-analysis offers the opportunity to put the results reported by Benassy-Quéré et al. (2007) 
into a broader context. Moreover, we do not have to compute the overall tax effect from par-
tial effects by imposing the budget constraint ex post. We instead regard tax effect estimates 
from primary regressions which do not explicitly control for the (partial) influence of public 
spending on FDI as estimates of the overall tax effect. This is in line with Brueckner (1979, 
1982) who, however, examines the overall effect of public goods on property value in order 
to test for the nonexistence of Tiebout equilibrium (also known as the Brueckner-Test). Bru-
eckner explicitly recognizes that the inclusion of both tax and expenditure side variables into 
empirical estimation equations implicitly assumes their ceteris-paribus variation and thus ne-
glects the public budget constraint. He therefore solely estimates the public good coefficient 
and excludes the tax variable from the regression. Thus, the tax rate is allowed to vary implic-
itly in response to a change of public spending policies in order to maintain budget balance 
for the government. The coefficient for public good then gives the estimate for the respective 
overall effect, covering any possible tax implications.
27 
Drawing an analogy to the context of this meta-study, we are able to statistically compare the 
overall effect and the ceteris-paribus effect of taxation on FDI. Estimates for the first of both 
effects are obtained from primary regressions without public spending control, i.e. allowing 
for implicit variation of expenditures in response to a tax change. The second effect is instead 
                                                 
27.  Since Brueckner (1979, 1982) argues within the scope of capitalization theory where local governments 
maximize property values (and not agents’ utility) he can explicitly verify if equilibrium is reached by look-
ing at the t-value of the public good variable coefficient  estimate. In equilibrium, the expenditure  side 
should have no significant effect on property value as the effect of a marginal increase in public goods is ex-
actly compensated for by the implicit tax reaction. In the Zodrow and Mieszkowski world the moderating 
impact of public spending can be verified but not efficiency of public good provision. Here, capital is the 
left-hand variable. Utility and capital maxima, however, do not necessarily coincide.   - 34 - 
 
obtained from regressions which simultaneously control for the tax burden and public expen-
ditures and thus rest on the assumption of ceteris-paribus variation in these variables. By 
means of a meta-regression dummy variable taking the value one if primary studies did not 
explicitly control for public spending and zero otherwise we can statistically test for a moder-
ating impact of the expenditure side. In more econometric terms, we will see if the omission 
of  expenditure  side  variables  biases  the  estimated  tax  effects.  As  we  hypothesize  public 
spending to have a moderating effect, we expect a negative coefficient of the dummy variable, 
i.e. studies not controlling for the ceteris-paribus effect of public spending and thus letting it 
vary implicitly with a tax change estimate lower adverse tax effects (in absolute terms). 
7.   Results 
7.1   Classical Meta-Analysis  
The results of the classical meta-analysis are shown in Figure 3. It contains the pooled effects 
resulting from the random effects model only as the Q-test clearly indicates the presence of 
considerable heterogeneity across studies (p < 0.01) for all four estimations. Thus, only the 
random effects meta-analysis is viable as opposed to fixed effects estimation.  





min: pooled semi-elastic ity based on minimum estimates from each study
mprec: pooled semi-elasticity based on most precise estimates from each study
med: pooled semi-elasticity based on median estimates from each study
max: pooled semi-elasticity based on maximum estimates from each study











We find that – independent of the percentile of semi-elasticity chosen (min, max or median) – 
the effect of taxation on FDI is significantly different from zero (p < 0.01). The most precise 
estimates  are  also  highly  significant.  The  pooled  effect  for  the  minimum  semi-elasticities 
amounts to 0.173. In contrast, the upper bound that is set by the pooled effect for the maxi-
mum effect sizes is 3.973. We calculate a pooled effect for the respective median effect sizes 
of each study which amounts to 1.683. Selecting the most precise estimate from each study 
gives a pooled semi-elasticity of 1.358. It should be noted that the results for minimum and - 35 - 
 
maximum estimates cannot merely be explained by outliers as these have been eliminated 
from the sample before. Overall, the pooled estimates define a continuum of plausible values 
as depicted in Figure 3. 
7.2   Meta-Regressions 
7.2.1 First Round Meta-Regressions 
Semi-elasticities as dependent variable 
Table 8 shows the results for the broad set of meta-regression estimators applied in a first 
step. Columns (1) to (7) respectively represent the results from pooled OLS, feasible GLS, 
fixed-effects  meta-regression  (FE  WLS),  mixed-effects  meta-regression  (ME  WLS),  fixed 
effects cluster analysis, random effects cluster analysis via REML and random effects cluster 
analysis based on GLS.  
Clearly, many of the fundamental model characteristics controlled for in this first round esti-
mation show significant coefficients across different estimators. The employment of aggre-
gate data or aggregate data on affiliates, respectively, as opposed to micro level information 
does indeed lead to higher primary tax-rate elasticities according to (nearly) all estimators. As 
regards the influence of the tax rate chosen, the effective average tax rates (EATR) generally 
yield higher primary estimates than those produced when country statutory tax rates are em-
ployed. This effect, however, is only significant in the case of pooled OLS, both fixed and 
random effects meta-regression and random effects GLS. The evidence for the effective mar-
ginal tax rate (EMTR) is less clear-cut. Most coefficients indicate a negative but insignificant 
impact on primary semi-elasticities, only fixed effects meta-regression and the within estima-
tor as well as random effects GLS show significant, but contradictory results.  
 36 
 
Table 8: First round results for semi-elasticties 
Pooled estimators  Cluster-Econometric Estimators 
Dependent Variable: Semi-elasticities 
Standard Pooled  Traditional Meta-Regression 
Fixed  
Effects  Random Effects 
  POLS  FGLS  FE WLS  ME WLS  FE  RE (REML)  RE (GLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Data Structure (Time Series)   
Cross-section  1.758  0.308  -0.979  -0.0164  2.710  0.424  0.615 
  (1.187)  (0.908)  (0.606)  (0.936)  (3.232)  (1.419)  (1.476) 
Panel Data  -0.365  -0.385  -0.262  -0.778**  -2.015  -0.928  -0.827 
  (0.350)  (0.361)  (0.518)  (0.303)  (1.569)  (1.067)  (1.119) 
Location Choice  
(Continuous Capital Data)  -0.890  -0.692  0.052  -0.895  -5.284***  -1.574**  -1.368** 
  (1.059)  (0.561)  (0.369)  (0.619)  (1.186)  (0.683)  (0.615) 
Aggregation Level (Micro data)   
Aggregate Data  2.303***  1.880***  1.245***  1.857***  -  1.489  1.628*** 
  (0.698)  (0.402)  (0.417)  (0.475)    (0.923)  (0.532) 
Aggregate Data on Affiliates  1.894**  1.393***  0.922**  1.536***  6.116***  1.400*  1.408** 
  (0.797)  (0.451)  (0.348)  (0.519)  (1.270)  (0.829)  (0.649) 
Tax Burden Measure  
(Country Statutory Rate)   
Micro Average Tax Rate  -0.360  -0.227  1.875***  0.170  0.151  -0.057  -0.091 
  (1.003)  (0.628)  (0.664)  (1.030)  (1.067)  (0.647)  (0.675) 
Macro Average Tax Rate  -1.094  -1.380***  1.074**  -1.722**  -1.668  -1.693  -1.596 
  (0.667)  (0.399)  (0.419)  (0.657)  (1.697)  (1.140)  (1.073) 
State Statutory Tax Rate  2.615**  2.705**  3.724***  2.553***  -  2.773***  2.717** 
  (1.064)  (1.274)  (0.846)  (0.934)    (1.061)  (1.151) 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate  -0.488  -0.671  1.728***  -0.337  -0.868*  -0.755  -0.726* 
  (0.613)  (0.473)  (0.374)  (0.539)  (0.444)  (0.519)  (0.379) 
Average Effective Tax Rate  1.057**  0.508  1.611**  1.101**  0.335  0.656  0.727** 
  (0.503)  (0.360)  (0.608)  (0.531)  (0.411)  (0.556)  (0.355) 
Constant  0.942  1.625**  -0.812  1.579**  4.012***  2.277  2.051 
  (0.939)  (0.659)  (0.883)  (0.689)  (1.484)  (1.453)  (1.258) 
Observations  708  708  707  707  708  708  708 
R
2  0.145  0.179  0.281  0.134  0.047  -  - 
F-/Wald-test (H0: all coefficients = 0)  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.001 
Clustered standard errors (POLS, FGLS, WLS) or robust standard errors (FE, REML, RE GLS) in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% level. Primary 
semi-elasticities haven been multiplied by (-1). All study/model characteristics are coded as dummy variables. Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the 
variables explicitly included. The base characteristics are indicated in parenthesis for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of the dummies indicate the effect on primary 
semi-elasticities of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification. Abbreviations for the employed estimators are explained in the text (top of previous page). 37 
 
As regards the influence of macroeconomic average tax rates as compared to country statutory 
rates, most coefficient estimates are negative, but only sometimes significant. Fixed effects 
meta-regression again shows significant but opposite results for this characteristic. Employing 
microeconomic average tax rates does not yield different primary semi-elasticities as com-
pared to statutory tax rates according to all meta-regression estimators, again with the excep-
tion of traditional fixed effects meta-regression. State statutory tax rates lead to higher tax 
effect  estimates  as  compared  to  the  use  of  tax  rates  at  the  federal  level.  Whether  cross-
sectional or panel data is used as opposed to time series analysis is not relevant according to 
most estimators. Precisely, only mixed effects meta-regression indicates a significant negative 
impact of using panel data. Studies which examine the location choice of companies system-
atically measure lower tax effects. For all cluster econometric approaches this effect is sig-
nificant. Accordingly, the localization of economic rents as compared to marginal investment 
decisions seems less influenced by taxes. This result would be in line with the findings of De 
Mooij and Ederveen (2006). It will, however, need further investigation to be clearly verified. 
Table 9: Choosing the preferred meta-regression estimator (semi-elasticities) 
Data characteristic  Test  Result  Preferred estimators 
Breusch Pagan test  χ²(1)= 6.98; p < 0.01 
1. Heteroscedasticity? 
White test  χ²(30)= 121.57; p < 0.01 
FGLS, FE WLS, ME 
WLS 
2.  Unexplained 
heterogeneity? 
Q - test  Q = 6726.37; p < 0.01  FGLS, ME WLS 
Breusch Pagan LM test  χ²(1)= 12.63; p < 0.01  3. Study-specific ef-
fects? 
Wooldridge-type test  SN = 1.86; p = 0.03 
Cluster-econometrics 
(FE, RE) 
4. Endogeneity?  Robust Hausman test  F(8, 41) = 19.71; p <0.01  FE 
1. Heteroscedasticity: Breusch Pagan and White test are both based on test statistics which are χ²-distributed 
under the null of no heteroscedasticity. In the present case both tests reject the null of no heteroscedasticity at 
very high significance levels. 2. Unexplained heterogeneity: The Q-test is based on a test statistic which is χ²-
distributed under the null of no heterogeneity. Here, the null of no heterogeneity is rejected at very high signifi-
cance levels. 3. Study-specific effects: The Breusch Pagan LM and the Wooldridge-type assume a null of no 
unobserved study-specific effects. Under the null the Breusch Pagan LM test is χ²-distributed, while the Wool-
dridge-type test is asymptotically distributed as standard normal under the null. Both tests reject the null at high 
significance  levels.  4.  Endogeneity:  F-test  in  the  context  of  an  artifical  regression  following  Wooldridge 
(2002), also see the explanations in the text. The null of no correlation between the study-specific unobservable 
effect and the moderator variables is rejected at high significance levels.  
Although most of the applied meta-regression estimators give congruent indications as re-
gards the influence of study characteristics on primary tax effect estimates, they rely on dif-
ferent assumptions regarding the characteristics of the meta-data, as has been outlined in sec-38 
 
tion 5. We therefore employ the series of tests described in section 6 in order to find the esti-
mator which is most suitable for the actual data at hand. The test results are given in Table 9. 
First, we run a standard RESET test on the basic specification employment in these first round 
estimations. The result (F(3,694) 13.93 = , p < 0.01) forces us to reject the null of correct spe-
cification. We truncate our meta-sample at the extremes and successively rerun the test until 
the null is no longer rejected. Comparing the implications of running the regressions on this 
truncated sample, no qualitative differences occur. We thus go on with the meta-regression 
based on the full sample. In a next step we find clear evidence for heteroscedasticity in the 
meta-regression error terms by means of a Breusch Pagan LM test (
2 χ (1) = 6.98, p < 0.01) 
and a White test (
2 χ (30) = 121.57, p < 0.01). This result clearly favors meta-regression esti-
mators which explicitly cope with heteroscedasticity. As a Q-test (Q = 6726.37, p < 0.01) run 
after the mixed-effects meta-regression identifies remaining unexplained heterogeneity, we 
can exclude fixed effects WLS from the set of applicable estimators. In order to assess wheth-
er meta-regression models should account for a nested error structure, we add to the standard 
Breusch Pagan LM test (
2 χ (1) = 12.63, p < 0.01) the Wooldridge-type test (test = 1.86, p = 
0.03) outlined above. Apparently, unobserved study-effects are present. Cluster econometric 
techniques are thus preferred over pooled estimators. As we find clear evidence for endogene-
ity, only the fixed effects cluster estimator is viable. To gain insights into the effects of vari-
ables which are constant within studies we also apply the FEVD technique. Another robust-
ness check includes a traditional mixed effects meta-regression based on WLS. 
T-values as dependent variable 
Replacing semi-elasticities by primary t-values on the left-hand side of the meta-regression 
equation implies that resulting meta-coefficients do not only measure the impact of consid-
ered meta-regressors on mere effect size. In contrast, t-values by definition also contain in-
formation about primary estimate precision. Thus, both types of analysis should be regarded 
as complementary rather than substitutes. In the light of the insights gained from both analy-
ses some statements made solely on the grounds of semi-elasticities might be put into per-
spective. 39 
 
Table 10: First round results for t-values  
Cluster-Econometric Estimators  Dependent Variable: T-
values  Pooled Estimators 
Fixed Effects  Random Effects 
  POLS  FGLS  FE  RE (REML)  RE (GLS) 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Data Structure (Time Se-
ries)           
Cross-section  2.012**  2.147***  0.697  -0.007  0.006 
  (0.895)  (0.641)  (1.193)  (1.271)  (1.021) 
Panel Data  1.078**  0.920*  1.024  0.229  0.228 
  (0.454)  (0.484)  (0.752)  (0.896)  (0.731) 
Location Choice  
(Continuous Capital Data)  -0.839  -0.630  -1.348***  -0.901*  -0.897** 
  (0.523)  (0.382)  (0.402)  (0.484)  (0.351) 
Aggregation Level (Micro 
data)           
Aggregate Data  -0.131  -0.127  -  -0.233  -0.241 
  (0.657)  (0.681)    (0.881)  (0.735) 
Aggregate Data on Affiliates  -1.051**  -1.247***  1.046**  -0.681  -0.698 
  (0.413)  (0.397)  (0.445)  (0.768)  (0.556) 
Tax Burden Measure  
(Country Statutory Rate)           
Micro Average Tax Rate  -0.832  -1.088*  0.883  0.565  0.557 
  (1.252)  (0.570)  (0.697)  (0.498)  (0.619) 
Macro Average Tax Rate  -1.374  -1.585**  -2.369***  -1.688*  -1.681** 
  (1.127)  (0.648)  (0.750)  (0.862)  (0.729) 
State Statutory Tax Rate  -2.042**  -2.030***  -  -0.914  -0.922 
  (0.892)  (0.546)    (1.162)  (0.780) 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate  -0.994  -1.077*  -0.157  -0.237  -0.241 
  (1.147)  (0.603)  (0.296)  (0.356)  (0.302) 
Average Effective Tax Rate  0.0862  0.261  0.230  0.204  0.204 
  (0.972)  (0.399)  (0.374)  (0.393)  (0.343) 
Constant  2.809**  2.952***  1.720**  3.111**  3.119*** 
  (1.139)  (0.942)  (0.708)  (1.232)  (0.928) 
Observations  729  729  729  729  729 
R
2  0.121  0.190  0.022     
F-/Wald-test  
(H0: all coefficients = 0)  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.001  p = 0.089  p = 0.003 
Clustered standard errors (POLS, FGLS) or robust standard errors (FE, REML, RE GLS) in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes signifi-
cance at the 1%/5% /10% level. Primary t-values have been multiplied by (-1). All study/model characteristics are coded as 
dummy variables. Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the variables explicitly included. The base char-
acteristics are indicated in parenthesis for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of the dummies indicate the effect on 
primary t-values of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification. Abbreviations for the employed estimators are ex-
plained in the text. 
The first round results for the meta-regressions which use primary t- and z-values as depend-
ent variable are given in Table 10. As compared to the first round results for the semi-elastici-
ties the influence of many fundamental primary characteristics are less significant. Neither the 
employment of effective tax rates (as opposed to the country statutory rate) nor the use of 
aggregate data (as opposed to micro data) has a significant impact on t-values according to all 
or all but one of the applied estimators. Strikingly, the impact of model and study characteris-
tics on semi-elasticities or t-values respectively is not always of the same sign. The state tax 
rate here shows negative coefficients and the effect is significant. According to most estima-
tors, the macroeconomic average tax rate is a rather crude measure to capture tax incentives. It 
leads to much lower primary t-values as compared to the statutory rate. Furthermore, aggre-40 
 
gate studies do not yield higher t-values as compared to micro data studies. As for studies 
using aggregate data on affiliates the evidence is not quite clear, since we find significant ef-
fects with different signs according to the different estimators. However, in any case the con-
siderable bias in semi-elasticities does not seem to fully translate into higher t-values, i.e. sig-
nificance of the tax effects. The presumed upward bias due to endogeneity problems in aggre-
gate studies thus seems to be counteracted by higher standard errors of the primary tax effect 
estimates. Attributing this observation to problems of measurement error in the context of 
aggregate studies seems plausible. Again, the influence of taxes is less important for the deci-
sion on the location of economic rents as compared to investment decisions conditional on 
location choice. So we measure generally lower t-values for studies analyzing location choice 
as compared to studies examining continuous FDI. However, similar to what we find in the 
analysis focusing on semi-elasticities, the significance of this effect becomes not absolutely 
clear by looking at the results across Table 10.  
Table 11: Choosing the preferred meta-regression estimator (t-values) 
Data characteristic  Test  Result  Preferred estimators 
Breusch Pagan LM test  χ²(1)= 10.19, p < 0.01 
1. Heteroscedasticity? 
White test  χ²(30)= 41.18, p = 0.08 
FGLS 
Breusch Pagan LM test  χ²(1)= 102.95, p < 0.01  2. Study-specific ef-
fects? 
Wooldridge-type test  test = 1.54, p = 0.06 
Cluster-econometrics 
(FE, RE) 
3. Endogeneity?  Robust Hausman test  F(8, 41) = 3.17, p < 0.01  FE 
See Footnote of Table 9 for explanations. 
Starting  with  the  series  of  test,  we  compute  a  RESET  test  for  misspecification 
(F(3,715) 2.43 = , p =0.06) and find only relatively weak evidence for a rejection of the null. 
However, we still repeat the same procedure as in the case of semi-elasticities until the null is 
clearly accepted. Again, we find no qualitative differences in results for the regressions on the 
truncated sample and go on with the analysis on the full meta-dataset. The subsequent tests 
and resulting statistics used to identify the preferred meta-regression estimator for the analysis 
of t-values are indicated in Table 11. Again, we find clear evidence for heteroscedasticity. 
Study-specific unobserved effects are present according to the standard Breusch Pagan test as 
well as to the more robust Wooldridge-type test. The robust Hausman test based on the artifi-
cial regression approach, however, reveals an endogeneity problem linked to the unobserv-41 
 
ables. Thus, our preferred estimator is the fixed effects cluster estimator. In order to gain in-
sights on the effect of within-invariant variables we again apply the FEVD technique. Another 
robustness check will also look at FGLS results.  
7.2.2 Second Round Meta-Regressions 
Semi-elasticities as dependent variable 
The results for the second round meta-regression with semi-elasticities on the left-hand side 
are indicated in Table 12. First, we extend the first round specification by including the newly 
coded model characteristics (Column 1). Obviously, splitting the effective forward-looking 
tax rates in bilateral and unilateral tax burden measures reveals that particularly the bilateral 
measures seem to capture adverse tax effects on foreign direct investments. Both the bilateral 
marginal tax burden measures and the bilateral average tax rate significantly raise primary tax 
effect estimates as compared to statutory rates. Strikingly, employing the domestic unilateral 
effective tax rates (EATR and EMTR) leads to significantly lower estimated semi-elasticities 
as compared to the use of statutory rates. These measures might thus indeed mix aspects of 
competitive (tax) advantage for multinationals over domestic firms and pure adverse tax ef-
fects. This supports the reasoning of Egger et al. (2008), who explicitly prefer bilateral tax 
burden measures in the FDI context. However, the significantly negative coefficient of the 
effective average unilateral tax rates is not robust across specifications. This seems intuitively 
plausible since the EATR is to a considerable extent driven by the statutory tax rate.   
Country fixed effects significantly reduce primary tax effect estimates. They thus do indeed 
show the opposite sign of the coefficient we find for aggregate studies. The latter is still high-
ly significant and positive for studies based on aggregate data on affiliates. In the left four 
columns of Table 12 we could not estimate a coefficient for aggregate studies due to a lack of 
within-study variation. The inclusion of time fixed effects, however, does exert no effect on 
estimated semi-elasticities. Strikingly, regarding the implications of considering the public 
expenditure side in primary regressions, we do not identify a significant bias. Also the sign of 
the effect of not-including a public spending control is not as expected. In other words, allow-
ing public spending to adjust to tax changes and thus not including it into the primary regres-
sion does not lower the estimated adverse tax effects. As this result contradicts theoretical 
presumptions, it might at least in parts be explained by hitherto insufficiently precise proxies 
for relevant public inputs from the companies’ point of view.    42 
 
Table 12: Second round results for semi-elasticities 
Extensions  Robustness Checks 














  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Data Structure (Time Series)   
Cross-section  2.263  2.285  3.953  5.167  5.167  -1.087  -1.805 
  (3.233)  (3.219)  (2.523)  (3.585)  (3.659)  (0.788)  (2.113) 
Panel Data  -0.713  -0.368  0.746  1.153  1.153  0.155  -2.594 
  (1.601)  (1.730)  (1.316)  (2.269)  (1.268)  (0.752)  (1.776) 
Location Choice  
(Continuous Capital Data)  -5.284***  -5.067***  -3.515***  -4.612***  -4.612***  -4.612***  -0.968 
  (1.189)  (1.256)  (1.233)  (1.282)  (0.922)  (0.953)  (0.662) 
Aggregation Level (Micro data)   
Aggregate Data  -  -  -  -  3.945***  2.367***  2.515*** 
          (0.131)  (0.183)  (0.574) 
Aggregate Data on Affiliates  5.548***  5.304***  3.673***  4.861***  4.861***  4.861***  2.347*** 
  (1.243)  (1.327)  (1.282)  (1.347)  (1.202)  (1.280)  (0.474) 
Tax Burden Measure  
(Country Statutory Rate)   
Micro Average Tax Rate  -0.237  -0.203  -0.00450  -0.0478  -0.0478  -0.0478  -0.130 
  (1.074)  (1.065)  (0.735)  (1.069)  (0.578)  (0.593)  (0.698) 
Macro Average Tax Rate  -2.594  -2.725*  -0.960  -2.553  -2.553  -2.247***  -0.522 
  (1.627)  (1.651)  (0.943)  (1.659)  (1.561)  (0.753)  (1.266) 
State Statutory Tax Rate  -  -  -  -  3.495***  4.467***  3.845* 
          (0.289)  (0.775)  (2.065) 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate  -1.424**  -1.411**  -0.851**  -1.405**  -1.405***  -1.405***  -0.235 
  (0.572)  (0.569)  (0.348)  (0.570)  (0.396)  (0.425)  (0.665) 
Average Effective Tax Rate  -0.666  -0.655  -0.733**  -0.663  -0.663*  -0.663*  0.086 
  (0.438)  (0.433)  (0.319)  (0.426)  (0.397)  (0.390)  (0.343) 
Bilateral Marginal Effective Tax Rate  1.099***  1.123***  0.949***  0.979***  0.979***  0.979***  0.377 
  (0.315)  (0.315)  (0.257)  (0.328)  (0.309)  (0.300)  (0.717) 
Bilateral Average Effective Tax Rate  3.566***  3.562***  3.144***  3.465***  3.465***  3.465***  1.806*** 
  (0.538)  (0.538)  (0.479)  (0.544)  (0.438)  (0.452)  (0.604) 
No Control for Public Spending (Control)  0.460  0.466  0.253  0.507  0.507  0.507  0.408 
  (0.863)  (0.864)  (0.533)  (0.942)  (0.766)  (0.682)  (0.373) 43 
 
Extensions  Robustness Checks 














  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Specification (no Fixed Effects)   
Time Fixed Effects  -0.332  -0.422  0.389  -0.381  -0.381  -0.381  -0.970* 
  (0.530)  (0.512)  (0.466)  (0.513)  (0.497)  (1.014)  (0.518) 
Country Fixed Effects  -1.302***  -1.312***  -1.062***  -1.246***  -1.246***  -1.246***  -0.468 
  (0.298)  (0.297)  (0.239)  (0.325)  (0.246)  (0.440)  (0.311) 
OLS Estimation (other than OLS)        -1.229***  -1.229***  -1.229***  -0.655* 
        (0.442)  (0.386)  (0.399)  (0.339) 
Type of Industry (not specified)   
Manufacturing Industry        0.971*  0.971**  0.971**  0.856** 
        (0.515)  (0.452)  (0.478)  (0.405) 
Financial Services        0.891  0.891*  0.891**  1.599* 
        (0.705)  (0.465)  (0.411)  (0.900) 
Finance (not specified)               
Retained earnings        1.168  1.168  1.168  0.083 
        (1.437)  (0.949)  (1.101)  (0.843) 
Transfers of Funds        0.667  0.667  0.667  -0.453 
        (1.210)  (0.913)  (1.060)  (0.520) 
Double Taxation Relief System (not specified)   
Credit System        0.211  0.211  0.211  -0.145 
        (0.788)  (0.496)  (0.499)  (0.615) 
Exemption System        0.107  0.107  0.107  -0.498 
        (0.787)  (0.496)  (0.505)  (0.521) 
Control Variables (not included)   
Control for Home Tax        -1.979  -1.979*  -1.979*  -0.221 
        (1.829)  (1.089)  (1.171)  (0.496) 
GDP        -0.197  -0.197  -1.016**  0.178 
        (1.943)  (2.300)  (0.413)  (0.585) 
Openness        -1.388***  -1.388***  -2.004***  -1.822*** 
        (0.353)  (0.373)  (0.392)  (0.224) 
Agglomeration Effects        1.013  1.013  -0.001  0.053 
        (2.160)  (1.568)  (0.214)  (0.541) 
Exchange Rate        1.178  1.178  1.178  0.695 
        (1.808)  (2.096)  (1.586)  (0.765) 
Wage        -1.258  -1.258  0.200  0.456 
        (0.889)  (0.926)  (0.511)  (0.419) 44 
 
Extensions  Robustness Checks 














  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
FDI Target Regions (no specific region)   
Europe        -  2.743***  0.963***  0.080 
          (0.178)  (0.184)  (0.423) 
United States        -  -1.175***  -3.253***  -3.242* 
          (0.192)  (0.592)  (1.858) 
Average Sample Year        -0.105  -0.105  -0.105  0.0258 
        (0.137)  (0.0911)  (0.116)  (0.0563) 
Publication Bias   
Standard Error    0.0709    0.0957  0.0957  0.0957  0.498*** 
    (0.123)    (0.113)  (0.0754)  (0.0753)  (0.139) 
Standard Error * D_pos      0.578***         
      (0.109)         
Standard Error * D_neg      -1.284***         
      (0.147)         
Constant  3.865**  3.516**  1.557  212.3  209.1***  213.3***  -47.92 
  (1.647)  (1.772)  (1.303)  (271.9)  (0.133)  (0.708)  (111.4) 
Observations  700  699  699  699  699  699  699 
R
2  0.075  0.076  0.527  0.099  0.315  0.315  0.284 
F-test (H0: all coefficients = 0)  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% level. Primary semi-elasticities haven been multiplied by (-1). All extensions are esti-
mated by fixed effects (within) estimation. Robustness checks 1 and 2 employ the fixed effects vector decomposition technique (FEVD), see Pluemper and Troeger (2007). 
Robustness check 1 includes only within study invariant characteristics into the 2
nd stage of the FEVD estimator, robustness check 2 uses FEVD with also the least within-variant 
variables included into the 2
nd stage. All study/model characteristics (except average sample year and standard error) are coded as dummy variables. Thus, a base model repre-
sents the characteristics redundant to the variables explicitly included. The base characteristics are indicated in parenthesis for each study dimension. Estimated coefficients of 
the dummies indicate the effect on primary semi-elasticities of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification.  45 
 
Another aspect which has so far not been considered in surveys of the literature on FDI and 
taxation is publication bias. In Column 2 we consider unidirectional publication bias by in-
cluding the standard error of the primary estimates into the meta-regression. However, studies 
on FDI and taxation do not seem to be significantly biased according to this approach. Re-
searchers do not try to raise effect size estimates in response to imprecise estimation tech-
niques. The conclusions are, however, quite different if we look at what is found for the more 
sophisticated approach introduced by Bom and Ligthart (2008). Positive tax effect estimates 
apparently are pushed even more if estimates tend to be imprecise. Negative tax effect esti-
mates are even more negative in response to high standard errors. Both effects are significant. 
Bidirectional publication bias thus seems to be present. However, it is not persuasive that re-
searchers who identify attracting effects of taxation on FDI tend to insist on their findings and 
try to push them towards significance. According to the 
2 R of the regression in Column 3 the 
approach by Bom and Ligthart leads to a veritable jump in the explained variation of primary 
estimates.  However,  by  construction,  the  interaction  terms  (Standard  Error  *  D_pos)  and 
(Standard Error * D_neg) show a fairly high (within-) variation as compared to the other re-
gressors. This, however, fosters significance of the two examined correlations. For this reason 
we hesitate to interpret the corresponding results as revealing causality and rely on the unidi-
rectional approach in the remaining meta-regressions.  
In Column 4 of Table 12 we estimate a fully extended meta-regression with additional study 
and model characteristics which might admittedly have an impact on primary study results 
(De Mooij and Ederveen 2003, 2005, 2006). Almost all results are in line with the findings of 
De Mooij and Ederveen (2003, 2005, 2006). The system of double taxation avoidance in the 
parent country or the mode of finance (retained earnings vs. transfer of funds) does not influ-
ence the estimated tax effects. Primary studies controlling for the openness of the target econ-
omies yield significantly smaller semi-elasticities while most of other primary control vari-
ables (GDP, Agglomeration effects, Exchange rates and wage) do not have significant im-
pacts on measured tax effects.
28 The mean sample year also has no impact on primary esti-
mates of the tax effect on FDI. Controlling for home country taxes exerts no significant effect 
on primary tax effect  estimates. The respective meta-coefficient, however, has a negative 
sign. Interestingly, studies who apply OLS as opposed to any other estimation technique (e.g. 
instrumental variable estimators) significantly measure lower tax effects on FDI. Finally, we 
find that studies explicitly concentrating on manufacturing industries find higher effect esti-
                                                 
28.  De Mooij and Ederveen (2005), however, found that controlling for agglomeration effects had significant 
impacts on primary estimates. 46 
 
mates as opposed to those which do not specify the sectors covered by their analyses. The 
inclusion of all these meta-regressors do not change the results found before. Please note that 
all our second round results show no significant effect of the data structure – panel, cross-
section or time series – on primary results. This is in contrast to earlier findings of De Mooij 
and Ederveen and might be due to the partly modified study classification. 
The last three columns of Table 12 represent robustness checks. In Column 5 we estimate the 
full model via FEVD. This is particularly interesting as it allows for the identification of the 
effects of study-level variables (or within-invariant model-level characteristics) on primary 
semi-elasticities. Besides the statutory tax rate the focus, of course, is on the coefficient esti-
mate for aggregate data studies. For both of these variables we find the first stage regression 
results confirmed as the measured effects are positive and highly significant. In the course of 
this robustness check we also take a look at FDI target regions considered in primary work. 
Precisely, we test whether tax effects significantly differ if studies focus exclusively either on 
European countries or the US as FDI target. This was not possible as long as standard fixed 
effects estimation was employed. The benchmark model for both characteristics is defined by 
those studies which examine a mix of regions, typically a broad set of OECD countries. Ap-
parently estimated adverse tax effects on FDI are stronger for only Europe as compared to the 
benchmark, while the tax effect measured for the US is below the benchmark. As to the im-
plications regarding the estimated coefficients of the other meta-regressors, only changes in 
significance might occur. This is the case for the effects estimated for the average effective 
tax rate and for models estimated solely on information about financial service industries. In 
Column 6 we make use of the possibility to include not only purely within-invariant variables 
into the second stage of the FEVD estimator, but we further add the most rarely changing 
model-level  variables  to  this  stage  of  the  estimation  procedure.  This,  however,  does  not 
change the results except that the effect for GDP control now turns out to be significant. In 
Column 7 we again look at results from WLS mixed effects meta-regression. We find that 
significance for some of the effects identified is lost. Particularly, this holds for the influence 
of target regions on primary semi-elasticities as well as for the effects of employing bilateral 
marginal tax rates or location choice analysis. Additionally, we now find the effects of the 
inclusion of time fixed effects into primary regressions to be significant, while fixed effects 
no longer seem to change primary results significantly. But many results also do not change 
with respect to significance. This is particularly the case for the effect of using aggregate data 
and bilateral average tax rates.  47 
 
T-values as dependent variable 
For the second round computations with t-values on the left-hand side (Results: Table 13) a 
set of specifications and estimators similar to the one applied to semi-elasticities is chosen. 
An important difference, however, is that we cannot control for the (non-)existence of publi-
cation bias in the literature by including primary standard errors on the right-hand side of the 
meta-regression because this would imply simultaneity problems. As a solution we simply 
include a dummy reflecting the publication status of primary work into the regressions. As 
publication status represents a study-level characteristic which is by definition invariant with-
in studies we unfortunately cannot use standard within estimation to examine publication bias. 
Therefore we address this issue later in the course of two robustness checks we perform on 
the basis of FEVD (see Columns (3) and (4) in Table 13). As a third robustness check Column 
(5) in Table 13 is estimated by pooled FGLS. Generally, the results – as displayed in Table 13 
– are again fairly robust across specifications. However, for some regressors we see switches 
with respect to the apparent significance of the effects they exert on t-values.  
In principle, the presumptions from the first round estimates are confirmed. While aggregate 
studies produce higher semi-elasticities as compared to micro data studies they do not yield 
more significant tax effects. According to the results in Columns (3) and (4), t-values are even 
significantly mitigated. The picture is somewhat different in the case of studies using aggre-
gate affiliate data. Here, a higher significance of primary tax effects is generally identified. To 
investigate this point in more depth we run a simple POLS regression of primary effect stan-
dard errors on the examined study and model characteristics.
29 Indeed we find that aggregate 
studies as well as studies based on aggregate affiliate data produce significantly higher stan-
dard errors as compared to micro data studies. And indeed, this effect is most pronounced for 
aggregate studies.  
According to all specifications estimated by the consistent fixed effects estimators, we finally 
confirm that the decision where to locate economic rents indeed responds less to taxes than 
continuous investment decisions at the margin. This proposition has already been put forward 
by De Mooij and Ederveen (2006). It, however, contradicts the general presumptions drawn 
from the fact that estimated coefficient for marginal tax burden measures (e.g. EMTR) are 
generally lower (again in absolute terms) than those for their inframarginal ones. This often is 
seen as an implicit indication for relatively low tax responsiveness of marginal investment 
decisions (see. e.g. Devereux and Lockwood 2006). A plausible explanation of the results 
                                                 
29.  Results are available upon request. 48 
 
obtained from the meta-regressions might be based on the fact that decisions at the margin are 
by definition very difficult to capture – even on the basis of high quality continuous capital 
data. For example, Overesch and Wamser (2008b) found that the EATR effect on continuous 
investment decisions conditional on location choice is still higher than the EMTR effect.  
 Table 13: Second round results for t-values 
Extensions  Robustness Checks 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Data Structure (Time Series)   
Cross-section  -1.311  -0.275  -0.275  -3.246***  -2.582 
  (1.300)  (1.622)  (1.427)  (0.472)  (1.631) 
Panel Data  1.009  0.876  0.876  -1.881***  -1.781 
  (1.167)  (1.333)  (0.724)  (0.465)  (1.359) 
Location Choice  
(Continuous Capital Data)  -1.554***  -1.697***  -1.697***  -1.697***  -1.156** 
  (0.466)  (0.542)  (0.352)  (0.347)  (0.492) 
Aggregation Level (Micro data)           
Aggregate Data      -0.273*  -0.428***  0.826 
      (0.154)  (0.113)  (0.628) 
Aggregate Data on Affiliates  1.084  1.276*  1.276***  1.276***  0.813* 
  (0.668)  (0.731)  (0.473)  (0.465)  (0.459) 
Tax Burden Measure  
(Country Statutory Rate)   
Micro Average Tax Rate  0.537  0.657  0.657  0.657  -0.814 
  (0.642)  (0.591)  (0.443)  (0.461)  (0.519) 
Macro Average Tax Rate  -4.002***  -4.025***  -4.025***  -1.799***  -1.369* 
  (0.607)  (0.714)  (0.915)  (0.614)  (0.691) 
State Statutory Tax Rate  -  -  -1.428***  -0.460  1.373 
      (0.227)  (0.326)  (1.278) 
Marginal Effective Tax Rate  -0.779***  -0.646**  -0.646**  -0.646**  -0.989** 
  (0.279)  (0.298)  (0.271)  (0.265)  (0.470) 
Average Effective Tax Rate  -0.698*  -0.548  -0.548  -0.548  -0.0743 
  (0.364)  (0.356)  (0.442)  (0.414)  (0.290) 
Bilateral Marginal Effective Tax Rate  2.207***  2.248***  2.248***  2.248***  0.718* 
  (0.369)  (0.348)  (0.342)  (0.294)  (0.373) 
Bilateral Average Effective Tax Rate  3.692***  3.570***  3.570***  3.570***  0.919 
  (0.542)  (0.521)  (0.476)  (0.431)  (0.555) 
No Control for Public Spending (Con-
trol)  0.506  0.0810  0.0810  0.0810  -0.148 
  (0.519)  (0.316)  (0.247)  (0.452)  (0.322) 
Specification (no Fixed Effects)   
Time Fixed Effects  -1.882***  -2.211**  -2.211*  -2.211**  -1.066 
  (0.575)  (0.877)  (1.166)  (0.893)  (0.652) 
Country Fixed Effects  0.0148  0.147  0.147  0.147  -0.755*** 
  (0.891)  (0.921)  (0.497)  (0.491)  (0.248) 
OLS Estimation (other than OLS)    -0.749**  -0.749***  -0.749***  -0.216 
    (0.298)  (0.162)  (0.156)  (0.330) 
Type of Industry (not specified)   
Manufacturing Industry    -0.483  -0.483  -0.483  0.576 
    (0.397)  (0.393)  (0.334)  (0.387) 
Financial Services    1.148**  1.148**  1.148***  0.355 
    (0.514)  (0.463)  (0.341)  (1.005) 
Finance (not specified)           
Retained earnings    0.176  0.176  0.176  0.0372 
    (0.580)  (0.719)  (0.744)  (0.680) 
Transfers of Funds    -0.218  -0.218  -0.218  -0.926 
    (0.481)  (0.621)  (0.641)  (0.622) 49 
 
Extensions  Robustness Checks 










  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Double Taxation Relief System (not 
specified)   
Credit System    -0.125  -0.125  -0.125  -0.116 
    (0.460)  (0.381)  (0.336)  (0.467) 
Exemption System    -0.605  -0.605*  -0.605*  -1.168** 
    (0.456)  (0.357)  (0.309)  (0.460) 
Control Variables (not included)   
Control for Home Tax    -0.759  -0.759  -0.759  -1.334** 
    (0.523)  (0.741)  (0.733)  (0.564) 
GDP    0.972  0.972  0.647***  -0.516 
    (1.208)  (0.772)  (0.249)  (0.558) 
Openness    -2.038***  -2.038***  -1.335***  -1.235*** 
    (0.407)  (0.531)  (0.241)  (0.416) 
Agglomeration Effects    -1.755  -1.755  0.676*  -0.621* 
    (2.378)  (2.471)  (0.362)  (0.327) 
Exchange Rate    -0.223  -0.223  -0.223  1.667* 
    (1.319)  (1.088)  (1.256)  (0.990) 
Wage    1.806  1.806*  0.826***  0.181 
    (1.329)  (0.976)  (0.312)  (0.416) 
FDI Target Regions (no specific 
region)   
Europe      0.159  0.155  -0.520 
      (0.0988)  (0.121)  (0.419) 
United States      0.162  -2.166***  -3.459*** 
      (0.138)  (0.326)  (1.140) 
Average Sample Year    -0.0127  -0.0127  -0.0127  0.0722 
    (0.0568)  (0.0692)  (0.0725)  (0.0492) 
Publication Bias   
Unpublished (Published)    -  -1.186***  -0.713***  -0.936* 
      (0.219)  (0.155)  (0.477) 
Constant  2.714***  28.90  29.56***  32.19***  -135.9 
  (0.923)  (112.9)  (0.257)  (0.474)  (96.74) 
Observations  721  721  721  721  721 
R
2  0.086  0.130  0.456  0.456  0.313 
F-test (H0: all coefficients = 0)  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000  p = 0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***/**/* denotes significance at the 1%/5% /10% level. Primary t-values have been mul-
tiplied by (-1). All extensions are estimated by fixed effects (within) estimation. Robustness checks 1 and 2 employ the fixed 
effects vector decomposition technique (FEVD), see Pluemper and Troeger (2007). Robustness check 1 includes only within 
study invariant characteristics into the 2
nd stage of the FEVD estimator, robustness check 2 uses FEVD with also the least within-
variant variables included into the 2
nd stage. Robustness check 3 is estimated by pooled FGLS. All study/model characteristics 
(except average sample year) are coded as dummy variables. Thus, a base model represents the characteristics redundant to the 
variables explicitly included. The base characteristics are indicated in parenthesis for each study dimension. Estimated coeffi-
cients of the dummies indicate the effect on primary t-values of choosing a characteristic in lieu of the base specification.  
With respect to the influence of the data structure on primary results, the results in Column (4) 
suggest that both panel and cross-section significantly reduce primary t-values as compared to 
time-series studies. However, the majority of results do not back this conclusion. We there-
fore conclude that there are other study characteristics than the data structure which are deci-
sive for estimated effect sizes.  
Drawing on the specific issues analyzed in the extensions, we first can confirm that bilateral 
tax rates indeed do not only raise primary tax coefficients but also the measured significance 
of tax influences on FDI. In contrast, public spending still does not influence primarily identi-
fied t-values. It thus neither affects semi-elasticities nor their significance. From a theoretical 50 
 
point of view this is somewhat disappointing. However, one might conclude that the search 
for appropriate proxies of relevant public inputs should not yet be abandoned. Interestingly, 
country fixed effects do generally not have a significant influence on primary t-values. Obvi-
ously, tax burden measures in most studies show sufficient variation and are not absorbed into 
more general time-invariant location characteristics. It thus seems indeed advisable to control 
for location fixed effects especially in studies based on aggregate data, since this corrects 
some of the bias in measured tax coefficients (see again Table 12) without sacrificing signifi-
cance of the tax effect. Time fixed effects significantly reduce the significance of primary tax 
effects. Tax effects are thus rather absorbed by temporary macroeconomic conditions within 
countries or regions than by static location characteristics. All these effects are robust to the 
extension towards the full model. Moreover, we find that the coefficients for the way of fi-
nance and openness of the target economy are fully in line with the prior results for semi-
elasticities, i.e. their effects on primary tax coefficients and significance are congruent. Some 
of the remaining regressors (e.g. manufacturing industry data) seem to exert significant effects 
on semi-elasticities, but not on t-values or the other way around. 
As concerns the assessment of publication bias we have to rely on FEVD estimates performed 
as a general robustness check in Column (3) of Table 13. Obviously, unpublished studies pro-
duce significantly lower t-values than published work. So this might not be in line with the 
conclusions we drew from Column (2) of Table 12. But note that current publication status 
might only reflect a temporary stage of the publication process and most researchers would 
probably not want to adjust results before or during the following review process. So the in-
fluence of publication status might rather reflect other effects adherent to relatively new work 
which was not adequately captured by the study-specific effects of our meta-regression than 
different (implicit) requirements as concerns significance for published and unpublished re-
search. Therefore more weight should be given to the findings in Column (2) of Table 12 as 
this is clearly the more established way to cope with the issue. As a result, publication bias is 
not yet considered as unambiguously verified.  
Strikingly, the influence of geographic FDI target regions (“Europe only” and “US only”) on 
effect size estimates which we identified on the basis of the regressions based on semi-elasti-
cities is confirmed only for the United States. Investors targeting this economy apparently do 
not base their decisions on tax aspects.  
Finally, the results from FGLS estimation in Column (5) of Table 13 should be addressed. 
Most results are in line with those obtained from the fixed effects cluster econometric estima-51 
 
tion. There are, however, also some differences. While the coefficient for country fixed ef-
fects is positive and significant, FGLS identifies no significant effect for time fixed effects. 
Also the results for macroeconomic average tax rates are of opposite sign and significant. Fur-
thermore, no significant impact on primary t-values is identified for the bilateral average tax 
rate (p = 0.106). But remember that the evidence against simple pooled estimation from our 
series of tests is fairly pronounced. Thus, the pooled FGLS results are put into perspective. In 
addition, choosing the optimal meta-regression estimator is not a minor issue with respect to 
results, but represents a precondition for valid and reliable inference based on meta-data. 
8.  Conclusions 
Tax competition and tax harmonization still are among the central themes in public econom-
ics. Proof of this contention is the ever increasing amount of theoretical and empirical studies. 
Meanwhile, meta-analyses of these empirical studies exist. This paper does not simply present 
another meta-analysis. In addition to an extension of the data base and a deeper methodologi-
cal discussion and approach, the main interest of our paper is the moderating influence of con-
trol variables, in particular public spending and agglomeration effects, on the estimated tax 
rate effects on FDI as they could be obtained from the existing empirical studies. 
According to our meta-analysis, a pooled effect based on medians, which seems rather robust 
to different variations, could be obtained that amounts to a semi-elasticity for company taxes 
on FDI of 1.68 in absolute terms. The most precise estimate of semi-elasticities is 1.39 in ab-
solute  terms.  Both  effects  are  highly  significantly  different  from  zero  in  statistical  terms. 
While they obviously are also economically significant, this range of semi-elasticities is not 
implausibly high. Taxes matter for location decisions and FDI. 
The meta-regressions reported in this paper indicate that the heterogeneity in the semi-elasti-
cities and the t-statistics from the different empirical studies can be fairly well explained by 
characteristics of the studies. We do not find overwhelming support for publication bias in the 
meta-regressions with semi-elasticities as dependent variable, but some publication bias in the 
meta-regressions with t- and z-statistics as dependent variable. The use of aggregate data 
leads to higher semi-elasticities, but significantly reduces t-values and thus implies less pre-
cise estimates. Using aggregate data on affiliates significantly increases both. The inclusion of 
country fixed effects might correct for some of the potential bias in aggregate studies, and it 
does not even lead to lower significances. Apparently tax rates are sufficiently time-variant. 
Interestingly we find that including time fixed effects reduces the significance of tax effects. 52 
 
Regarding the choice of tax rates, unilateral effective average tax rates do not lead to signifi-
cantly higher tax effect size estimates or significances as compared to the statutory rate. Mar-
ginal effective tax rates even yield lower effects. This is probably not due to lower tax sensi-
tivity of marginal investment decisions, because we find evidence that discrete investment 
choices are less sensitive. The low effect for EMTR might thus stem from problems of identi-
fying marginal choices in reality. Bilateral tax rates best capture tax incentives and yield both 
significantly higher effect size estimates as well as higher significances. Finance and home 
country double taxation relief do not influence investment decisions.  
Regarding the control variables, it is most interesting that primary estimates are not signifi-
cantly affected by the inclusion of public spending. According to most estimates in the litera-
ture, the spending side does not moderate the tax rate effects. The results reported by Bé-
nassy-Quéré et al. (2007) do thus not find general support. This might be due to the fact that 
only crude measures of public inputs are used in many studies. Similarly agglomeration ef-
fects do not have any robust significant effect on estimated tax effects on FDI in the primary 
studies. Certainly, more research is needed to find out whether the provision of public goods 
is empirically related to tax rate effects or whether this is really a pure tax competition game.   
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